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HIS Article discusses significant decisions of the Texas Supreme
Court and Texas courts of appeals during this Survey period.
I. BAD FAITH
A. ARTICLE 21.21 DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES
In Watson v. Allstate Insurance Co. I the Fort Worth court of appeals ad-
dressed the issue of what rights, if any, a third-party claimant has under a
liability policy prior to the time when either a judgment is obtained or the
insurer agrees to a settlement in writing. Watson was involved in a motor
vehicle collision with an Allstate insured. Suit was filed by Watson against
Allstate prior to obtaining any judgment or settlement. Summary judgment
was granted by the trial court in favor of Allstate. On appeal, Watson con-
tended that the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment and in
holding that (1) Allstate owed no duty of good faith and fair dealing; (2)
Watson was not a consumer under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act;2 and
(3) Watson was not entitled to bring an action under article 21.21 of the
Texas Insurance Code. 3
With respect to the duty of good faith and fair dealing issue, Watson con-
tended that she was an intended third-party beneficiary of the liability pol-
icy, and such relationship gave rise to a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Watson first argued that under prior Texas case law, the duty of good faith
and fair dealing should be extended to third-party claimants under a liabil-
ity policy. 4 The court of appeals rejected this argument, noting that in Chaf-
fin v. Transamerica Insurance Co. 5 the Houston court of appeals had held
* B.B.A., Texas A & M University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Cooper & Huddleston, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., Texas A & M University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Cooper & Huddleston, Dallas, Texas.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Judith H. Winston and Robin S. Ken-
nedy, Attorneys at Law, members of the Appellate & Insurance Section of Cooper & Huddle-
ston, in preparation of this article.
1. 828 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ granted).
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-63 (Vernon 1987).
3. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
4. Watson relied primarily on the cases of Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Ins.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987); Sentry Ins. v. Siurek, 748 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987, no writ); and Chaffin v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.
App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ rerd n.r.e.).
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that the duty of good faith and fair dealing was not owed by a liability in-
surer to an injured third party.6
Watson also sought to rely upon Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Childress7 in support of her assertion that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing should extend to a claimant in her position. 8 This argument was
rejected by the court of appeals because Watson did not have a mature claim
under the policy by reason of having obtained a judgment or settlement
agreed to in writing, unlike the claimant in Childress.9
The court of appeals also rejected Watson's claim for relief under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). It noted that in order to
have standing under the DTPA, one must be a "consumer."' 0 To be a "con-
sumer" under the act, a person must have sought or acquired, by purchase
or lease, goods or services.I' Because Watson had neither sought nor ac-
quired, by purchase or lease, goods or services from Allstate, she had no
standing to maintain an action under the DPTA.' 2 Watson sought to cir-
cumvent this result by arguing that she was seeking to acquire insurance
proceeds, pursuant to the mandatory automobile liability scheme of the
Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. The court of appeals re-
jected this argument, noting that insurance proceeds are neither goods nor
services. 13
The final issue before the court of appeals was whether Watson had stated
a valid claim under article 21.21, section 16 of the Texas Insurance Code 4.
Watson contended that Allstate had violated that section with respect to the
unfair claims settlement practices rule contained in section 21.203(4) of the
Texas Administrative Code. 5 The court noted that an action under section
16 of article 21.21 may be maintained by "a person," and that the person is
6. 828 S.W.2d at 426. At least two of the courts of appeals have also held that an insurer
does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to an insured third party. Hart v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 756 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ); Caserotti v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 791 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied). Indeed, the rule
adopted is in line with the majority rule in other jurisdictions. See Dickey v. Alabama Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 693, 694 (Ala. 1984); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d
584, 588 (Cal. 1976); Eichler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987);
Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Me. 1977); Magalski v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 318 A.2d 843, 848 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Chavez v. Chenoweth, 553
P.2d 703, 709 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976); D. H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. v. American Home
Assurance Co., 502 N.E.2d 694, 698 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1140 (1986); see also R. B. Cooper & Michael W. Huddleston, Insurance
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 461, 470 (1991).
7. 650 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1983).
8. In Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770, 775-76 (Tex. 1983),
the Texas Supreme Court held that a third-party claimant under an automobile financial re-
sponsibility liability policy had the right to sue for damages under the policy and for attorney's
fees once a judgment had been obtained.
9. Watson, 828 S.W.2d at 426.
10. Id. at 427.
11. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (4) (Vernon 1987).
12. 828 S.W.2d at 427.
13. Id.
14. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981).
15. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.203(4) (West 1988). That section makes it an unfair
claims settlement practice for a company not to attempt "in good faith to effectuate prompt,
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not required to be a consumer as defined by the DTPA. 16 The court did
note, however, that a claim brought under article 21.21 must be related to
the "business of insurance." 17 While the court originally defined "business
of insurance" according to federal law,' 8 on rehearing the court withdrew
this holding and inferred that the phrase as defined by section 2(a)(6) of
article 1.14-1 of the Texas Insurance Code would control.' 9 The court held
that Watson's claim satisfied the definition because the "settlement of claims
made by third parties arising out of the policy between the insurer and its
insured is so closely related to the policy so as to constitute the 'business of
insurance.' "20 The court held on rehearing that this was true regardless of
the standard used, either state or federal. 21 Because Watson's claim under
section 21.203(4) of the Texas Administrative Code satisfied the require-
ments of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, the trial court erred in granting
Allstate's summary judgment. 22
Several flaws in the Watson decision are readily apparent. First, the court
noted decisions contrary to its own opinion and made no attempts to distin-
guish them. The most prominent decision was Chaffin v. Transamerica In-
surance Co. 23 In Chaffin, an attempt was made by a third-party claimant to
assert a cause of action under article 21.21 against a liability carrier. The
court in Chaffin noted the definition of "a person" contained in Section 2 of
article 21.21 in ruling that "we find no authority for extending the construc-
tion of 'person' beyond one who is either an insured or a beneficiary of the
policy."'24
A second flaw in the decision is in the court's statutory construction of the
unfair claims settlement practices rules.25 In order to maintain an action
under those rules, one must possess a "claim" as that term is defined by the
Administrative Code. Section 21.202 defines "claim" as "[a] request or de-
fair and equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably
clear."
16. 828 S.W.2d at 427. The court, however, does not discuss the definition of "person" as
contained in article 21.21. Section 2(a) of article 21.21 defines a person as "any individual,
corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurer, fra-
ternal benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance, including
agents, brokers, adjusters, and life insurance counselors." TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
21.21(2)(a) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added). Clearly, Watson was not engaged in the insur-
ance business and would not constitute a person as that term is defined by article 21.21. How-
ever, the supreme court in Ceshker v. Bankers Commercial Life Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 128, 129
(Tex. 1978), disapproved of a construction of the word "person" as limited to one "engaged in
the business of insurance," even though the legislature had so limited the construction by its
definition.
17. Watson, 828 S.W.2d at 428.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 432.
20. Id. at 428.
21. Id. at 432.
22. Id. at 428.
23. 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see R. B.
Cooper & Michael W. Huddleston, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J.
395 (1988).
24. Id. at 731.
25. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 21.201-30 (West 1988).
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mand reduced to writing and filed by a Texas resident with an insurer for
payment of funds or the providing of services under the terms of a policy,
certificate, or binder of insurance." '26 In its motion for rehearing, the court
addressed the term "claim" as defined in the code and pointed out that Wat-
son was a Texas resident. 27 However, the court completely ignored the re-
quirement that the claim be requested under the terms of the policy. Under
the terms of the policy issued by Allstate to Watson, Watson had no rights
until she had obtained a judgment or a settlement agreed to in writing. Until
such time as one of these two events occur, the insurer has no duty to make
any payment to the injured party and, in fact, is immune to suit from the
injured party. 28 In effect, the Fort Worth court of appeals held that a carrier
can be liable for failing to make prompt, fair and equitable settlements of
claims when there is no legal or contractual duty to make such a
settlement.29
The Watson decision raises other policy considerations that were not ad-
dressed by the court of appeals. First, in creating duties owed to a third-
party claimant, the court in effect places the insurer in a conflict-of-interest
situation. A liability insurer's duty of loyalty ought to be owed to its policy-
holder. Here, however, the court creates other duties to third-party claim-
ants. This forces the liability insurer to balance the interests of the third-
party claimant against the interests of the insured. If, for example, the in-
sured does not want the claim settled and the third-party claimant does,
whose interest does the insurer represent? Watson totally fails to address
this important potential conflict.
Second, the decision fails to recognize that certain types of policies require
the insured's consent to settle. For example, many professional liability poli-
cies specifically state in the policy that the insurer may not settle a claim
without the consent of the insured. Again, under the Watson decision, an
insurer is exposed to a bad-faith lawsuit when it is prohibited from settling
with the claimant under the terms of its agreement with its insured. In addi-
tion, many policies are written over large self-insured retentions. If the in-
sured is unwilling to pay the self-insured retention, the insurer may
effectively be prevented from settling the case. Thus, the insurer may be
exposed to liability under the unfair claims settlement practices rule for cir-
cumstances over which it has no control.
A final internal inconsistency in the Watson decision is its conflict with
other decisions holding that a liability carrier owes no duty of good faith and
fair dealing to the claimant. Several Texas cases have held that a liability
26. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.202 (West 1988).
27. Watson, 828 S.W.2d at 429.
28. Id. at 425.
29. An analogous situation would exist under the typical homeowners policy. Under the
forms prescribed by the Department of Insurance, there is no duty to make payment until sixty
days after a proof of loss has been filed with the insurer. Under the Watson rationale, the
insurer could potentially be liable for failing to pay prior to the time a proof of loss has been
filed or prior to the expiration of sixty days, even though it had no obligation under the policy.
Such a rule is totally insupportable by logic and would, in effect, allow the court or jury to
rewrite a contract based upon what was reasonable at that particular point in time.
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insurer owes no duty of good faith and fair dealing to a third-party claimant
for the reason that no special relationship exists between the insurer and the
claimant. 30 As a result, the liability carrier and the third-party claimant are
at arms-length and may deal with each other as such. To hold that a liability
insurer holds statutory duties to such a claimant, but not the tort duty of
good faith and fair dealing, is to ignore the sound basis and reasoning for the
denial of such a duty to third parties under the tort duty cases.
The Texarkana court of appeals in CNA Insurance Co. v. Scheffey 31
reached an opposite result from the Fort Worth court of appeals' decision in
Watson. CNA was a worker's compensation insurance carrier for numerous
employers in the state of Texas. Scheffey was an orthopedic surgeon whose
practice included treatment of injured workers whose employers provided
worker's compensation insurance coverage through CNA. Scheffey filed a
slander and libel suit in which he claimed that CNA employees falsely
spread information. One claim raised by Scheffey was that he was a third-
party beneficiary and consumer under the policies of insurance that CNA
had issued to employers and that CNA had violated various insurance rules
and regulations under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. 32 The court
noted that Scheffey did not have standing to sue under the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act 33 because the act does not create a private cause of
action. 34 As a result, the only way in which standing might exist was if
Scheffey was a "person" under article 21.21. 35 The court held that there was
no authority for extending the meaning of the term "person" as found in
article 21.21, beyond one who is either an insured or an intended beneficiary
of the policy. 36 As a result, Scheffey had no standing to maintain a private
cause of action under article 21.21 under the circumstances of the case. 37
B. ESTOPPEL COVERAGE
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Taylor38 State Farm's insured, An-
glin, shot and killed Taylor in an argument over the repair of Anglin's lawn
mower by Taylor. State Farm initiated a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that it would not have any liability for any judgment obtained against
its insured because the shooting was intentional and thereby excluded from
coverage under the terms of its homeowners policy. While the declaratory
judgment was pending, the underlying lawsuit went to trial and resulted in a
judgment against State Farm's insured based upon findings of negligence in
30. Caserotti v. State Farm Ins. Co., 791 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ
denied); Hart v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 756 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no
writ); Chaffin v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 728, 731-32 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.).
31. 828 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
32. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
33. Id. art. 21.21-2.
34. 828 S.W.2d at 791.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 792.
38. 832 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
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the insured's shooting of Taylor.39 State Farm defended Anglin in that
lawsuit.
The trial court found that State Farm was estopped from proceeding with
the declaratory judgment because it did not seek to abate the pending wrong-
ful death action until the declaratory judgment action was determined. 4°
The court of appeals rejected this contention, noting that the Texas Supreme
Court has held that a declaratory judgment as to the insurer's liability for a
judgment against its insured may not be rendered prior to the entry of any
judgment against the insured. 4' Any opinion prior to that time is purely
advisory and beyond the power of the district court to render.42 As a result,
the court of appeals found that State Farm was not estopped from prosecut-
ing the declaratory judgment action following the entry of judgment against
the insured. 43
The Taylors next contended that State Farm was estopped from proceed-
ing with the declaratory judgment action by having defended its insured
while at the same time contesting coverage by means of the declaratory judg-
ment action. This contention was likewise rejected. The court of appeals
held that Texas law recognizes the right of an insurer to defend an insured
under a reservation of rights while at the same time reserving unto itself all
of its policy defenses in the event that the insured is found to be liable by the
jury in the underlying case against him.44
C. EXISTENCE OF INSURANCE CONTRACT STATUTORY VIOLATIONS
In Maccabees Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McNie145 an agent for Macca-
bees persuaded the Dallas County Hospital District to switch its group life
insurance coverage from Hartford to Maccabees. The agent assured the hos-
pital district that he had the authority to bind coverage as a representative of
Maccabees and that coverage would be in force the next day. On October
26, 1987, an active employee of the hospital, Vivian McNiel, died. On No-
vember 17, 1987, Maccabees sent a letter to the Dallas County Hospital Dis-
trict declining the application based on a provision in the application that
the coverage was subject to home office approval. Approval had been with-
held because the list of inactive employees was incomplete. McNiel's benefi-
ciary sued Maccabees and the hospital district. The case was tried to the
court, and judgment was entered in favor of McNiel. 46 Included in the judg-
ment was an award of $4,548 as penalty under article 3.62 of the Insurance
Code.47 Under article 3.62, an insured may recover, in addition to the
39. Id. at 647.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 648.
42. Id.; see also Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333
(Tex. 1968).
43. Taylor, 832 S.W.2d at 648.
44. Id. (citing Farmers Texas County Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ refd n.r.e.)).
45. 836 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.).
46. Id. at 231.
47. 836 S.W.2d at 231; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1981) (repealed).
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amount of the loss, twelve per cent damages and attorneys fees when an
insurance carrier fails to pay a life insurance claim within thirty days after
the claim is made.48 Maccabees argued that since no policy of insurance had
been in effect between it and the hospital district, no award could be made
under article 3.62. The trial court had found for McNiel on grounds of es-
toppel.4 9 The Dallas court of appeals found that the language of article 3.62
requires the existence of an insurance policy before the twelve per cent pen-
alty can be imposed.5 0 However, the court of appeals found that no such
requirement existed with respect to section 16 of article 21.21 and that statu-
tory damages could be recovered under that statute.51
D. EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY INADEQUATE DEFENSE BY
INSURED
In Laster v. American National Fire Insurance Co. 5 2 and Warren v. Ameri-
can National Fire Insurance Co.,53 which involved the same fact situation, a
federal district court and the Fort Worth court of appeals were each faced
with the question of what obligation an insured owes to an insurer when the
insured has rejected a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights letter. In
the underlying case, Laster had filed an action in the state district court
against Warren claiming that in September 1983 he was injured as a result of
having been struck by the swinging chute of a concrete truck owned by In-
ter-County Concrete. At the time suit was filed, the primary insurer for
Inter-County had become insolvent. In February 1987, Warren tendered his
defense to American National, the excess insurer. American National of-
fered to provide a defense to Warren, but insisted upon reserving its rights
with respect to the liability for the first million dollars of any recovery,
which had been covered under the insolvent insurer's policy. This offer was
rejected by Warren. In November 1988, Warren's attorney withdrew. Six
days after Warren's attorney withdrew, request for admissions were served
on Warren, who failed to respond. Thereafter, a summary judgment was
entered and eventually a verdict of almost three million dollars was entered
against Warren. 54
48. TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art 3.62.
49. Maccabees, 836 S.W.2d at 233.
50. Id. at 235. Article 3.62, repealed effective September 1, 1991, provided:
In all cases where a loss occurs and the life insurance company, or accident
insurance company, or life and accident, health and accident, or life, health and
accident insurance company liable therefor shall fail to pay the same within 30
days after demand therefor, such company shall be liable to pay the holder of
such policy, in addition to the amount of the loss, twelve (12%) per cent dam-
ages on the amount of such loss together with reasonable attorney fees for the
prosecution and collection of such loss. Such attorney fee shall be taxed as a
part of the costs in the case. The Court in fixing such fees shall take into consid-
eration all benefits to the insured incident to the prosecution of the suit, accrued
and to accrue on account of such policy.
51. 836 S.W.2d at 235.
52. 775 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Tex. 1991), arid, 966 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1992).
53. 826 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
54. 775 F. Supp. at 987.
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In both actions, American National asserted that it had no liability under
its policy because Warren had failed to provide an adequate defense. Both
courts held that when an insured rejects a defense pursuant to a reservation
of rights, there is an obligation on the part of the insured to take reasonable
steps to avoid or minimize legal liability. 5 5 Both the Laster and Warren
courts characterized the defense of the case as follows: "A more glaring case
of lack of cooperation by an insured and of calculated disregard of an excess
insurer's rights would be difficult to find. Improper collusive conduct on the
part of Warren and his counsel, to the detriment of American, is strongly
indicated by the summary judgment record." '56
The result in these cases is a fair one, as the duty to properly defend is
logically a mutual one. If an insured rejects a defense by the insurer under
reservation of rights, he should be held to a duty to conduct a reasonable
defense, just as the insurer that assumes the defense of an insured is held to a
duty to defend properly. The insured who rejects a reservation of rights and
then does not put on a reasonable defense should not be permitted to recover
under the policy.
E. STANDARD OF REVIEW
One of the more significant questions remaining in the area of bad faith is
the standard of review to be employed by trial and appellate courts in re-
viewing the evidence concerning bad faith. The San Antonio court of ap-
peals in State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Polasek57 presented an excellent
discussion of the different standards of review available to the courts and
adopted one that not only protects the rights of the insured but also affords
insurers some measure of predictability as to the result of their decisions.
The Polasek case arose out of a fire at Polasek's video rental business,
which was insured by State Farm. The claim was denied on the grounds
that the fire was the result of arson. The case was tried before a jury, which
found that the insureds had not started the fire and that State Farm had
acted in badfaith in denying the claim. 58 On appeal, the San Antonio court
of appeals reversed the holding as to bad faith. 59 The court noted that,
under Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America,6° carriers still have the
right to deny invalid or questionable claims and not be subject to liability for
an erroneous denial of a claim.6 1 As a result, the Polasek court held that a
bad faith cause of action requires much more demanding proof than a claim
on the insurance policy.62
55. Warren, 826 S.W.2d at 188; Laster, 775 F. Supp. at 995 (citing Britt v. Cambridge
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 717 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Harville
v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1989); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196
F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952)).
56. 775 F. Supp. at 999; 826 S.W.2d at 188 (quoting Laster, 775 F. Supp. at 999).
57. No. 04-92-00100-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Dec. 16, 1992, n.w.h.).
58. Id., slip op. at 1.
59. Id. at 19.
60. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
61. No. 04-92-00100-CV, slip op. at 15.
62. Id. at 6.
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Courts of appeals in the state have adopted at least two standards for
reviewing evidence in bad faith cases. Under one line of authority, the focus
of the inquiry has been whether or not there is "some evidence" that there
was not a reasonable basis for the denial.63 Under this line of authority, the
court will apply the traditional standard of review with respect to legal suffi-
ciency of the evidence. 64 The court would disregard all evidence supporting
the insurer's decision to deny the claim and determine if there was probative
evidence to support the jury's finding.65 The problem with this standard is
that it often equates an incorrect denial of a claim with bad faith. If there is
undisputed evidence before the carrier at the time it denies the claim, then
there should be no liability for bad faith denial of the claim as a matter of
law.
The second test employed by the courts of appeals is the reasonable basis
test. Under this test, if the record indicates that the insurer possessed evi-
dence reasonably showing that the insured's claim might not be valid, as a
matter of law, there can be no bad faith cause of action.66 The insured is
required to show that no reasonable basis existed for denying the claim.
67
To meet this burden, the insured must prove that there were no facts before
the insured which, if believed, would result in denial of the claim.68 Under
this line of authority, the trier of fact does not weigh the conflicting evi-
dence. 69 Rather, it decides whether the evidence existed and whether, stand-
ing alone, it constituted a reasonable ground for denying the claim. 70 Under
this standard of review, an insurer will not be required to pursue every possi-
ble avenue of investigation. 7 1 The Polaseks argued that an insurer has the
duty to "leave no stone unturned,"' 72 but the court of appeals rejected this
argument.7 3 If the insurer had before it evidence that would constitute a
reasonable basis for denial of the claim, then, as a matter of law, the insurer
cannot be liable for bad faith damages. 74
63. Commonwealth Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 825 S.W.2d 135, 144 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1992, writ dism'd). State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 598 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); Automobile Ins. Co. v. Davila, 805 S.W.2d 897, 905-06
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez,
793 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ granted); Allied General Agency, Inc. v.
Moody, 788 S.W.2d 601, 607 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ granted).
64. Polasek, No. 04-92-00100-CV, slip op. at 10.
65. Id.
66. St. Paul Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Fong Chun Huang, 808 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied); St. Paul Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Luker, 801 S.W.2d
614, 618 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ); Miller's Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lyons, 798 S.W.2d
339, 343-44 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ granted); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hud-
son Energy, 780 S.W.2d 417, 426-27 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989), af'd, 811 S.W.2d 552
(Tex. 1991); Fuentes v. Texas Employers Ins. Assoc., 757 S.W.2d 31, 33-34 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1988, no writ).
67. No. 04-92-00100-CV, slip op. at 9.
68. Id.
69. Id. slip op. at 11.
70. Id.






F. DUTY WHERE DENIAL WAS REASONABLE
Several cases during the Survey period have involved the issue of whether
an insured may obtain extracontractual damages for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing even if the court determines that the insurer was
correct in its coverage position. 75 In Snug Harbor, Ltd. v. Zurich Insur-
ance76 a former condominium development owner, Snug Harbor, brought a
state court action against a general liability insurer and its insured, First
South, a mortgagee. First South had foreclosed on the condominium devel-
opment and had allegedly mishandled the petition and citation that was to
be served on Snug Harbor, thereby causing a default judgment to be entered
against Snug Harbor in the state court.77 After a settlement in which Snug
Harbor took an assignment of First South's cross-claim against the insurer
for breach of the duty to defend, the federal district court found that Zurich,
the general liability insurer, had a duty to defend First South.78 A jury then
found that Zurich had acted in bad faith in failing to defend First South. 79
A judgment in the amount of $700,000 in actual damages (the amount of the
settlement), $30,000 in attorney's fees and $1.5 million in exemplary dam-
ages was entered against Zurich.80 Coverage issues in the case were (1)
whether Snug Harbor suffered "property damage," (2) whether, if "Snug
Harbor did suffer 'property damage,' such damage was caused by an 'occur-
rence' within the policy period, and (3) [whether] any coverage otherwise
applicable was excluded by the policy's 'care, custody, control' and exclusion
clause." 8 1
The Fifth Circuit, after finding that the loss did not constitute "property
damage" and that there was no "occurrence" during the policy period,
found that Zurich had no duty to defend its insured.8 2 It then found that
Zurich did not breach a duty of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to
defend First South.8 3 The court reasoned that Snug Harbor's claim of bad
faith was an appendage to its assertion that Zurich breached a contractual
duty to defend, a duty the Fifth Circuit found to be nonexistent, so the bad
faith claim was without merit.8 4 The court stated that "[a] finding of bad
faith could not be premised solely on the breach of a contractual duty, such
as the duty to defend," and that "delays or refusals to pay are not unreason-
able where there is a legitimate question of policy construction." 85
75. See, e.g., Koral Industries, Inc. v. Security-Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 136
(Tex. App.-Dallas), writ denied per curiam, 802 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1990).
76. 968 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1992).
77. Id. at 540. Subsequent to the default judgment, the insured was placed in conservator-
ship. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) intervened as defendants and removed the case to federal
court. Id. at 540-41.
78. Id. at 541.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 540.
82. Id. at 544-46. See discussion infra at notes 158-60.
83. 968 F.2d at 546-47.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 546 (quoting National Union Fire Ins. v. Hudson Energy, 780 S.W.2d 417, 427
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In Beaumont Rice Mill, Inc. v. Mid-American Indemnity Insurance Co.,86
after finding that the exclusion for injuries covered under the United States
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act applied to preclude
coverage, the Fifth Circuit 87 reached the issue of the award of damages by
the trial court for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by the
excess carrier, Mid-American. 88 The court held that even assuming that an
excess carrier owed such a duty, Mid-American could not have breached it
because its denial of the claim was reasonable. 89 The Fifth Circuit noted
that an insurer "maintains the right to deny an invalid or questionable claim
without becoming subject to liability for bad faith denial of the claim."' 9
The court therefore reversed the discretionary damage award under the
DTPA and the Insurance Code because Mid-American did not act in bad
faith and because the validity of the insured's claim never became reasonably
clear. 91 It also reversed the award for exemplary damages in tort, holding
that the reasonableness of Mid-American's position precluded such a recov-
ery: "[I]f failing to pay was justifiable, it could not be negligent, malicious,
or grossly negligent."'92
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty In-
surance Co. v. Kitty Hawk Airways, Inc.93 stated that it was unnecessary to
address whether the claimant could recover double damages from the in-
surer pursuant to section 16 of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code
because of the court's holding that the insurer's non-coverage defense barred
damages arising from the insured's defamation of the claimant. 94
G. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The Fort Worth court of appeals in Transportation Insurance Co. v.
Archer95 declined to extend the right to sue for the breach of a duty of good
faith and fair dealing to the spouse of an injured worker. In Archer the
insurer argued that the wife of the injured worker was not entitled to either
actual or exemplary damages because she lacked standing to sue under either
the duty of good faith and fair dealing or the Texas Insurance Code. The
insurer cited Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America96 as authority for its
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989), af'd, 811 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1981); Plattenburg v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 918 F.2d 562, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1990) ("where evidence shows justifiable reason existed for
action of insurer, action cannot, as a matter of law, constitute bad faith")).
86. 948 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1991).
87. See discussion infra notes 136-386.
88. 948 F.2d at 952.
89. Id. at 952 (citing Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987) ("lack of reasonable basis or failure to determine whether there was reasonable
basis for denial of claim under policy is an element of claim for breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing")).
90. Id. (citing Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1988);
Plattenburg v. Allstate Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1990)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 964 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992).
94. 964 F.2d at 483 n.18.
95. 832 S.W.2d 403, 405-06 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ granted).
96. 748 S.W.2d 210, 212-13 (Tex. 1988).
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proposition that the wife had no standing to sue for the breach of the com-
mon law duty of good faith and fair dealing. The wife, on the other hand,
asserted the cases of Torchia v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 97 and Under-
writers Life Insurance Co. v. Cobb98 as Texas authority for the right of a
spouse to join the injured worker in a claim against an insurer for breaching
the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Fort Worth court of appeals
distinguished Torchia and Cobb as having no bearing on the present case,
because whether or not a spouse has an independent right of recovery under
the duty of faith and fair dealing was not discussed in either opinion. 99
As almost a side note, the court of appeals denied that the wife had a
direct right of recovery under the duty of good faith and fair dealing for her
loss of consortium since only damages for interference with family relation-
ships, rather than loss of consortium, was pled.100 The court also declined
to rule on whether or not a spouse has standing to sue for violations of the
Insurance Code for allegations of wrongful claims handling.10' The court
tersely noted that since the wife did not elect to recover under the Insurance
Code, there was no issue to be addressed. 102
H. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S DUTIES To EXCESS CARRIER
In Stonewall Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Drabek 10 3 Stonewall Surplus
was the excess carrier for several insureds in a wrongful death suit. After the
suit was settled, Stonewall sued the law firm of Hirsch, Glover, the defense
attorneys hired by the primary carrier, for allegedly negligent actions, which
caused Stonewall to pay substantially more to settle the case than it should
have had to pay. During the course of the underlying suit, the trial court
found substantial discovery abuse, struck the defendant's pleadings and ren-
dered a partial default judgment. l04 The trial court determined that the only
issues remaining for trial would be: "(1) the amount of actual damages; (2)
whether the insureds were grossly negligent; and (3) the amount of exem-
plary damages which would be assessed against them upon a finding of gross
negligence."'' 0 5 After the imposition of the sanctions, the primary carrier
paid its limit of $500,000, while Stonewall contributed $1.3 million to the
settlement. Stonewall sued the law firm, alleging that the firm's negligence
had caused the court to strike the pleadings, resulting in the insurer's dam-
ages. In the malpractice claim, the trial court granted Hirsch, Glover's mo-
tion for summary judgment, finding that the law firm did not represent
Stonewall and did not owe it a duty.' 0 6 At the outset of the opinion, the
court noted that Texas has a well-settled principle that persons outside the
97. 804 S.W.2d 219, 225 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
98. 746 S.W.2d 810, 819 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
99. Archer, 832 S.W.2d at 406.
100. Id. at 405-06.
101. Id. at 406.
102. Id.
103. 835 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
104. Id. at 709.
105. Id. at 709-10.
106. Id. at 710.
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attorney-client relationship do not have a cause of action for injuries that
they sustain due to an attorney's failure to perform or the negligent perform-
ance of a duty owed to a client.10 7 The court also recognized that in the
absence of privity of contract, an attorney owes no duty to a third-party non-
client.108 However, the Stonewall court held that this rule did not apply in
this case."19 Specifically, the court stated that the primary carrier, pursuant
to its contract, hired Hirsch, Glover to defend the case on behalf of its in-
sureds.110 As such, the attorneys owed the defendants the unqualified duty
to conscientiously and adequately represent them.1 I' The excess carrier ar-
gued that in the face of the excess liability coverage contract, the excess
insurer stood in the place of the insureds and that it was subrogated to their
rights by reason having been required to pay more money in settlement of
the wrongful death case because of the negligence of the defense attorneys.
The court noted that the principles of equitable subrogation applied to the
facts of the Stonewall dispute.'1 2
Hirsch, Glover attempted to argue that American Centennial Insurance
Co. v. Canal Insurance Co. 113 supported its position that no duty was owed
to the excess insurer and that equitable subrogation was not an appropriate
theory for adoption under the circumstances of the case. However, the Fort
Worth court of appeals disagreed, stating that American Centennial was dis-
tinguishable because (1) the excess carrier's suit against the primary carrier
in this case had been severed from the suit against the defense attorneys and
(2) the insured's claim in American Centennial was barred by the two-year
statute of limitations, thus barring any claim the excess carrier might have
against the defense counsel in that case by equitable subrogation. 1 4
In American Centennial Insurance Co. v. Canal Insurance Co.115 the un-
derlying claim involved an automobile accident caused by a tire blow-out on
a rental car. The parents of the two girls who died in the accident sued the
rental company, which was insured by a primary carrier and two excess car-
riers. Apparently, during the course of defense, the primary carrier's attor-
ney mishandled the suit, and the insurers paid $3.7 million to settle the
case. '
16
After the settlement, the two excess carriers brought suit against the pri-
mary carrier and the defense counsel for negligence, gross negligence, breach
107. Id. (citing Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
108. Id. (citing Draper v. Garcia, 793 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, no writ)); see also First Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin, &
Stewart, 648 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bell v. Manning, 613
S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e).




113. 810 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist] 1991), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 843
S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1992).
114. 835 S.W.2d at 711.
115. 843 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1992).
116. Id. at 481.
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of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and violations of the DTPA and
Insurance Code. At trial, the court granted summary judgment, denying all
of the claims under the statute of limitations, while also finding that the
primary carrier owed no duty of care to the excess carriers. 1 7 The Houston
court of appeals (First District) reversed the summary judgment as to the
primary carrier, but affirmed as to the defense counsel based on the statute of
limitations." 18 In its decision, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the part
of the court of appeal's opinion pertaining to the primary carrier, but re-
versed the portion of the court's decision precluding the excess carrier's suit
against the defense counsel.' 19 At the outset of its opinion, the supreme
court noted that the Stowers doctrine 20 gives an insurer the right to sue a
primary carrier for the wrongful refusal to settle a claim within policy lim-
its.' 21 The court reiterated that the standard of an ordinarily prudent person
in business management applies to an insurer in claims investigation, trial
defense and settlement negotiations. 122 Noting that other states have found
that the doctrine of equitable subrogation permits a claim by an excess car-
rier against a primary carrier for the breach of a Stowers-type duty, the court
wrote that
the insurer paying a loss under a policy becomes equitably subrogated
to any cause of action the insured may have against a third party re-
sponsible for the loss. The excess insurer would thus be able to main-
tain any action that the insured may have against the primary carrier
for mishandling of the claim. 123
The court claimed that if the excess carrier could not bring such an equitable
subrogation type of claim, then the primary carrier would have less incentive
to settle within policy limits. 124 The court declined to recognize the exist-
ence of a direct action by excess carriers against primary carriers, approving
instead the same result through the equitable subrogation theory. 25 The
court went on to find that the excess carrier's claims for negligence, gross
negligence and violations of the DTPA and Insurance Code against the pri-
mary carrier were barred by the statute of limitations, although the equitable
subrogation claim on the Stowers action against the primary carrier was not
so barred. 126 However, the court found that the excess carrier's claims
against the attorneys were erroneously dismissed by the court of appeals,
which held that the claim accrued at the time of the attorneys' alleged mal-
practice.' 27 The court found that the court of appeals' holding conflicted
117. Id. For a discussion of the court of appeals' decision on these issues, see American
Centennial, 810 S.W.2d at 250-56.
118. American Centennial, 843 S.W.2d at 482.
119. Id. at 485.
120. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved).
121. 843 S.W.2d at 482.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 483.
125. Id.




with Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins,'28 which held that the statute of limita-
tions in an attorney malpractice claim is tolled until all appeals on the under-
lying claim are exhausted.' 29 The court further found that allowing
equitable subrogation actions by the excess insurer against defense counsel
did not interfere with the attorney-client relationship or result in additional
conflicts of interest.' 30 Thus, the supreme court's decision is clearly in line
with the Stonewall decision issued by the Fort Worth court of appeals.
I. MULTIPLE CLAIMANTS AND INSUFFICIENT INSURANCE
In Texas Farmers Insurance Company v. Soriano13 ' the San Antonio court
of appeals addressed for the first time the standard by which an insurer's
conduct is to be gauged in those situations in which it has multiple claims
that exceed its policy limits. This suit arose out of an automobile accident
between a vehicle driven by Soriano and a vehicle driven by Medina. Sori-
ano and his passenger, Lopez, had been drinking prior to the accident. As a
result of the accident, Lopez and Medina and his children suffered severe
injuries. Medina's wife was killed in the accident. Soriano was insured
under his parents' policy with Farmers, which had limits of $10,000 per per-
son and $20,000 per occurrence. Farmers initially offered $20,000 for the
Medina claims. The limits were refused. Thereafter, suit was filed by the
Medinas and by Lopez' parents against Soriano. Prior to trial, Farmers set-
tled with Lopez for $5,000 and offered the remaining $15,000 of insurance to
the Medinas. The offer was refused and a demand was made for the original
policy limits of $20,000.
The case went to trial and a judgment was entered against Soriano in the
amount of $172,187.132 Soriano then assigned his cause of action to the
Medinas in exchange for a covenant not to execute. In their suit against
Farmers, the jury found that Farmers was negligent in the handling of the
settlement negotiations and rendered judgment of actual damages in the
amount of $520,577.24 and exemplary damages of $5 million.' 33
The primary issue on appeal was what standard was to be applied in gaug-
ing the conduct of Farmers in attempting to settle several claims with insuffi-
cient policy limits. Three possible standards were identified by the majority
and the dissent. The plaintiffs contended that the court should adopt the
comparative seriousness rule. Under this rule, an insurer can be held liable
even though the first settlement was reasonable and entered into in good
faith when viewed apart from exposure in the second case.' 34 An insurer
must measure the proportional merits of each claimant and then settle the
cases accordingly. 135 If the insured is wrong in its assessment, then it be-
128. 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991).
129. American Centennial, 843 S.W.2d at 483.
130. Id. at 484.
131. 844 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, n.w.h.).
132. Id. at 813.
133. Id. at 813-14.




comes liable beyond its policy limits. 136 Applying the rule, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that it was unreasonable for Farmers to settle with Lopez because the
Medina cases were more serious and posed a greater threat to Soriano. The
comparative seriousness rule is contrary to the second standard identified by
the court and followed in most jurisdictions, that an insurer can settle with
some claimants in good faith even though the settlement may exhaust the
insurance coverage or deplete the limits such that a subsequent creditor may
have insufficient funds in which to satisfy its judgment. 137
Farmers and the dissent urged the adoption of the "viewed by itself'
rule. 138 Under this rule, the conduct of an insurer in a multiple-claim case
would escape liability if any settlement made by the insurer when viewed by
itself was not unreasonable, considering the other unsettled claims. 139 The
dissent set forth several reasons for the adoption of this rule. First, the in-
surer has a duty to the insured to use care in handling all claims against the
insured, not just those that are more serious. 40 Second, such a rule would
facilitate settlements.' 4' According to the dissent, the comparative serious-
ness rule would inhibit settlement in at least two ways. It would make settle-
ment with one or more but less than all claimants more risky for insurers
because of the lack of any defined standard.142 Also, such a rule would mo-
tivate multiple claimants who are faced with inadequate insurance to at-




In Centennial Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 144 the
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston found that allegations of
negligent hiring and negligent entrustment fell within the general liability
policy exclusion for injuries "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, op-
eration, use, loading or unloading of an automobile." The court noted that
the Texas Supreme Court had previously held in Fidelity & Guaranty Insur-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 840-41; see Voccio v. Reliance Ins. Co. 703 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983); Harmon
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 232 So. 2d 206, 207-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Haas v.
Midamerica Fire and Marine Ins. Co. 343 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); Castoreno v.
Western Indem. Co., 515 P.2d 789, 792-95 (Kan. 1973); Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc., 355 So.2d
1279, 1283-87 (La. 1978); Liguori v. Allstate Ins. Co., 184 A.2d 12, 15-17 (N.J. Super Ch. Div.
1962); Negron v. Eveready Ins. Co., 385 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Duprey v.
Security Mut. Cas. Co., 256 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965); Alford v. Textile Ins.
Co., 103 S.E.2d 8, 13 (1958); Scharnitzki v. Bienenfeld, 534 A.2d 825, 827 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987).
138. Soriano, 844 S.W.2d at 816.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 841 (Peoples, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 841-42.
142. Id. at 842.
143. Id.
144. 821 S.W.2d 192, 194, 196 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
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ance Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus145 that the automobile exclusion in a
standard homeowners policy specifically applied to claims of negligent en-
trustment because entrustment involves the core issue of whether the "use"
of the vehicle was negligent.' 46 The court rejected attempted distinctions
between negligent hiring and negligent entrustment. 147 The court empha-
sized that the negligent hiring by itself, "without the fatal injury ... caused
by the instrumentality of an automobile," would not even rise to the level of
a cause of action against the insured.148 The court refused to find the dis-
tinction urged by the insured to be supported by cases from other jurisdic-
tions involving two separate instrumentalities.' 49 The court also refused to
rely upon the decision of the Corpus Christi court of appeals in Warrilow v.
145. 633 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1982).
146. Centennial, 821 S.W.2d at 194. In Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v.
McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1982), the supreme court had the opportunity to consider
whether an allegation of negligent entrustment of an automobile would fall under the automo-
bile exclusion, thereby barring coverage for the allegation. The supreme court rejected the two
theories developed by other jurisdictions, which hold that negligent entrustment is a distinct
and specific cause of action based on either 1) the act of negligent entrustment itself or 2) the
more general concepts of ownership and use of a vehicle. Id. at 789. The court stated that to
recover for negligent entrustment in Texas it is essential that the owner or custodian have
negligently entrusted the vehicle and that the vehicle have been negligently operated or used by
the entrustee. Id. at 790. The court determined that whether the entrustment was to an in-
sured or a non-insured was immaterial because the plaintiffs still had to show negligent opera-
tion or use by the entrustee as an element of the cause of action. Id. "In other words there
would have been no accident in this case without the negligent operation or use of a recrea-
tional motor vehicle," the court stated. Id. "The homeowner's policy excludes coverage for
claims arising out of the ownership, use or operation of a recreational motor vehicle. [The
insurer] is under no duty to defend [the insured] under facts excluded from coverage under the
policy." Id.
The courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions to that in McManus in a
variety of circumstances. For example, in Louis Marsch, Inc. v. Pekin Ins. Co., 491 N.E.2d
432 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985), the claimant was injured by a dump truck driven by an employee of
Marsch. The court held that a negligent-hiring theory of recovery was not covered under a
homeowners policy. Id. at 437. The court held that under such a theory it is "necessary to
establish such negligence as the proximate cause of the damages to the third person, and this
requires that the third person must have been injured by some negligent or otherwise wrongful
act of the employee so hired." Id. The court added:
Thus, liability on the part of the employer to the third party cannot be predi-
cated upon the mere fact that the employer hired and retained in his employ-
ment a servant whom he knew or should have known to have been incompetent
.. . [T]here is no liability on Marsch's part under the negligent-hiring count
unless Clark's negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct in operating the dump
truck is also established. This instrumentality is the subject of the specific exclu-
sion in the Aetna policy. We hold that the Aetna policy does not potentially
afford coverage under the negligent-hiring (count VII), and Aetna has no duty
to defend upon it.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Massey v. Century Ready-Mix Corp., 552 So.2d 565, 568 (La.
Ct. App. 1989) (failure to warn); Picou v. Ferrara, 412 So.2d 1297, 1300 (La. 1982) (entrust-
ment/vicarious liability); Jones v. Louisiana Timber Co., Inc., 519 So.2d 333, 336-37 (La. Ct.
App. 1988) (negligent maintenance); Scarfi v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 559 A.2d 459, 461-63
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (negligent hiring and training); Ruggerio v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., 484 N.Y.S.2d 106, 106-07 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (negligent hiring).
147. 821 S.W.2d at 194-96.
148. Id. at 195.
149. Id. at 195 (discussing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 514 P.2d 123 (Cal.
1973) (involving use of an automobile and a handgun)).
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Norrell'50 .' 5' The court noted that two instrumentalities, an automobile and
a pistol, were involved in Warrilow as well.152 The court concluded that its
decision was supported by the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions
addressing the question. 153
B. OCCURRENCE/BODILY INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE/PERSONAL
INJURY
In Houston Petroleum Co. v. Highlands Insurance Co. 154 suit was brought
against the insured for fraud and misrepresentation with respect to the sale
of limited partnership units. First, the court held that an allegation of fraud
and false representation, coupled with additional allegations of "mental dis-
tress," fell within the policy definition of "bodily injury," which included
"mental injury, mental anguish, shock, fright, disability or death at anytime
resulting therefrom."'' 55 The court's decision appears to completely ignore
the fact that the "mental anguish" covered in the definition must "result
from" a "bodily injury, sickness or disease." ' 56
Second, the court held that allegations of "fraudulent promises, false rep-
resentations, and untrue statements" did not, as a matter of law, satisfy the
definition of "occurrence," which was defined as "an accident ...which
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured."' 57 The court found the language of the
insurance contracts to be unambiguous, and to hold otherwise would extend
the definition of "conditions", and consequently, "bodily injury" beyond
their natural meanings.158 Third, the court held that loss of use of invest-
ment funds, based upon the fraud and false representation allegations and
racketeering allegations, involved mere economic loss that did not fall within
the definition of "property damage" in the policy.' 59
Finally, the court held that allegations that the claimant's "personal and
business reputation and standing in the community" had been harmed as a
result of the accident in question were outside of the policy coverage for
"personal injury."' 16 The court emphasized that there were no allegations
150. 791 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
151. Centennial, 821 S.W.2d at 195-96.
152. Id. at 195.
153. Id. at 196 (citing Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 868 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1989)).
154. 830 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
155. Id. at 155-56.
156. Id. at 155.
157. Id. at 155-56.
158. Id. at 156.
159. Id. The policy defines "property damage" as:
(1) [P]hysical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during
the policy period, including the loss of use thereof resulting therefrom or (2) the
loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed
provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy period.
Id. at 156.
160. Id. at 156-57. The policy included coverage for "personal injury," which is defined in
part as including " 'the publication or utterance of a libel or slander or of other defamatory or
disparaging materials." Id. at 156.
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that the insured had "discriminated against or humiliated the [claim-
antsl."' 6 1 Further, the court held that the complaint did not allege any form
of actual defamation action. 162
C. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
In Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kitty Hawk
Airways, Inc. 163 the court held that Exclusion (c) in a general liability policy
providing personal injury coverage, which stated that the insurance did not
cover "personal injury sustained by any person as a result of an offense di-
rectly or indirectly related to the employment of such person," was unam-
biguous and barred any coverage for the employment-related defamation
claims in the underlying suit. 6'6 The court then addressed whether an ap-
proximate fourteen-month delay on the part of the insurance company in
providing a reservation of rights setting forth Exclusion (c) as a policy de-
fense resulted in the application of waiver and estoppel.' 65
First, the court held that there is an exception to the general rule that
waiver and estoppel cannot be used to create insurance coverage where none
otherwise exists under the terms of the policy. 166 This exception, the court
held, applies where the insurer defends the insured without a reservation of
rights or non-waiver agreement. 67
Second, the court held that the first element of the exception, proof that
the insurer had sufficient knowledge to raise the coverage defense, was satis-
fied in the case before it. 168 The court then focused on the defense exception
requirement, which states that the insured must show harm or prejudice as a
result of the insurance company's defending the suit without a reservation of
rights or non-waiver agreement. 169 The court, quoting State Farm Lloyd's,
Inc. v. Williams,' 70 noted that the insured must prove that "clear and unmis-
takable" harm has been suffered as a result of the insurer's defense.' 7 1 The
court added that "the insured must show 'how he was harmed.' 1172 The
court found that the Williams test for harm was the one most likely to be
adopted by the Texas Supreme Court. 173
The court found that the evidence presented on motion for summary judg-
161. Id. at 157.
162. Id.
163. 964 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1992). The author prosecuted the appeal on behalf of Penn-
sylvania National.
164. Id. at 480-81 (quoting Record Excerpts of Appellee Kitty Hawk Airways, Inc. at tab
i, p.55, Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kitty Hawk Airways, Inc., No. 91-1123 (5th
Cir. filed Aug. 14, 1991)).
165. Id. at 481-82.
166. Id. at 481.
167. Id. (discussing State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Williams, 791 S.W.2d 542, 550 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 481-82.
170. 791 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
171. 964 F.2d at 482 (quoting Williams, 791 S.W.2d at 553).




ment established the lack of harm or prejudice as a matter of law. 174 The
court stated that the insured produced no evidence that the attorneys hired
by the insurer committed wrongful acts in the defense of the case or other-
wise acted unethically. 175 Importantly, the court noted that, as in Williams,
the coverage defense based on Exclusion (c) was not one that was subject to
being manipulated either toward or away from coverage; the court stated
that the exclusion did not involve factual issues that were material to the
underlying tort suit. 176
One of the most important aspects of the decision in Kitty Hawk is the
emphasis placed by the court on the fact that the insured had more than two
years after the insurer sent the tardy reservation of rights letter within which
to retain its own counsel. 177 The court noted that the summary judgment
evidence included the letter from Kitty Hawk in which Kitty Hawk admit-
ted that it did not in fact have any complaints about the "able and compe-
tent manner in which the defense ha[d] been handled to date."' 178 Thus, the
court concluded: "the fact that [the insured] may have voluntarily relin-
quished rights associated with the control of its defense [did] not establish
that it suffered any harm."' 179 The court in Kitty Hawk, like the court in
Williams, refused to find that harm was to be presumed as a matter of law
where a defense was provided to the insured and a conflict of interest existed
based on the existence of the potential coverage defense.
The court's holding that the lack of prejudice was established as a matter
of law, considered in light of the arguments actually raised by the insured in
that case, shows the impact of Kitty Hawk. First, the court rejected argu-
ments that an affidavit of the insured's president, stating that "some infor-
mation" was passed on to the insurer by defense counsel, was evidence of
prejudice.' 80 Second, the court rejected the insured's argument that it did
not discover the conflict of interest as a result of the late reservation of rights
until too late in the litigation process to hire its own counsel.8' The record
established that the reservation of rights letter was sent almost two years
prior to the actual trial in the underlying case. Third, the Kitty Hawk court,
like the Williams court, rejected arguments that the entry of judgment in the
underlying suit against the insured somehow evinces prejudice. 182 The court
apparently reasoned that the entry of judgment was not evidence of harm
because there was no further evidence to establish that the judgment resulted
from detrimental reliance.
The underlying theme of Kitty Hawk is that the insured's acquiescence in
the continued defense of the suit by the insurer after receipt of a late reserva-
174. Id. at 482-83.
175. Id. at 482.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 483.
178. Id. (quoting Second Supplemental Record on Appeal, Vol. II, at 289-99, Kitty Hawk,
No-91-1123 (5th Cir. filed Aug. 26, 1991)).
179. Id.





tion of rights letter negates the existence of prejudice as a matter of law. The
insured knew of the timeliness issue, its own ability to demand an uncondi-
tional defense and its ability to defend itself. Where a party recognizes a
transaction as existing, "or acts in a manner inconsistent with its repudia-
tion, or lies by for a considerable time and knowingly permits the other party
to deal with the subject matter under the belief that the transaction has been
recognized, or freely abstains for a considerable length of time from im-
peaching it, so that the other party is thereby reasonably induced to suppose
that it is recognized, there is acquiescence, and the transaction, although
originally impeachable, becomes unimpeachable in equity.' 1 83 In such cir-
cumstances, counter-estoppel applies as well as waiver. Thus, the insured
knowingly relinquished its right to defend the case itself and could not claim
that it was prejudiced after acquiescing to the late reservation of rights. 184
D. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Associates,
Inc.,18 5 an action was brought against the insured for sexual harassment by
former employees. The claims included: "(1) gender-based discrimination,
(2) sexual harassment and discrimination leading to acute emotional distress,
183. 2 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 965 (1907). See De Boe v. Prentice Pack-
ing and Storage Co., 20 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Wash. 1933).
184. For example, in Winters v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 209 S.E.2d 32, 33-34
(Ga. Ct. App. 1974), the insurer sent a general reservation of rights with knowledge of specific
coverage defenses; a specific letter was not sent until five months after the defense was under-
taken by the insurer. Even though a general reservation is wholly ineffective, the court held
that a fact issue was presented as to whether the insured "knowingly accepted" the defense
subject to reservation so as to exonerate the insurer of the five-month delay. Id. at 34. The
court held that a question of the intent of the parties was presented. Id. An even more persua-
sive set of facts requiring reversal of summary judgment is presented in the instant case.
Clearly, where an insured makes no attempt to take over the defense or repudiate the reserva-
tion, it is impliedly assenting to the reservation. See Connolly v. Standard Cas. Co., 73
N.W.2d 119, 122 (S.D. 1955). This is a mere reflection of the rule that "where parties, by their
conduct and action recognize contracts as subsisting and binding, they thereby affirm the con-
tracts after acquiring knowledge of the facts which entitled them to rescind. This is the
equivalent o[f] ratification .. " Spellman v. American Universal Inv. Co., 687 S.W.2d 27, 29
(Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.). Even when a party has been actually
defrauded, such ratification waives any right to complain and or repudiate the agreement. Id.
Any act recognizing an agreement as subsisting, or conduct inconsistent with an intention to
avoid it, waives the right of repudiation. Id. at 30. Acceptance of benefits under such an
agreement, such as accepting continued defense under a reservation arrangement, recognizes
the agreement so as to waive or abandon the right to attack the agreement as invalid. Id.
"[U]nder Texas law, the equitable doctrines of laches, estoppel and waiver are all grounded
in the principle that a party with full knowledge of facts which entitle him to rescind a contract
will be barred from asserting his right where he fails to act promptly upon this right to the
detriment of another." Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co.,
752 F.2d 178, 182 (5th Cir. 1985). Equity will not hear a party "'stultify himself by com-
plaining against acts ... of which he has demonstrated his approval by sharing in their benefits
... [This is] particularly true where the acquiescence relates to rights of the assenting party
that are contractual in nature.'" Frank v. Wilson & Co., 9 A.2d 82, 86 (Del. Ch. 1939)
(holding a stockholder with notice was barred from asserting a corporate amendment was void
because of acquiescence). "[A]ssent is a necessary inference from acquiescence, and estoppel
was [is] the necessary consequence of assent." Id. at 88 (quoting Lowndes v. Wicks, 36 A.
1072, 1079 (Conn. 1897)).
185. 786 F. Supp. 629 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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(3) ratification of the discriminatory conduct by [the insured], (4) retaliation
for pursuing the claims, (5) violation of the Equal Rights Amendment of the
Texas Constitution, (6) violation of the Texas Human Rights Commission
Act, (7) negligence per se, and (8) negligent hiring."' 18 6 The court found that
there was no duty on the part of the general liability insurer to defend the
suit on behalf of the insured. 87 The court reasoned that all of the allega-
tions arose out of the alleged acts of sexual harassment. 188 The court rea-
soned that the allegations were not mutually exclusive, but in fact were
"related and interdependent."'' 8 9 The court noted that without sexual har-
assment, there would have been no basis for any suit against the insured,
much less the suit for negligence. 190 The court noted that acts of sexual
harassment are intentional and that such terms typically do not fall within
the definition of "occurrence" commonly used in insurance policies. 19' Ad-
ditionally, the court also noted that a multitude of cases had consistently
interpreted "occurrence" to exclude coverage for such intentional acts.1 92
The court noted that at least one Texas case, Aberdeen Insurance Co. v. Bo-
vee, 193 had found that there was no provision in the policy that obligated an
insurer to defend a claim for sexual harassment. 94 The court in Bovee de-
cided the case on the basis of the employment exclusion in the policy, which
bars coverage for bodily injury arising out of or in the course of employment
by the insured. 195
E. THE LHWCA ExCLUSION
In Beaumont Rice Mill v. Mid-American Indemnity Insurance Co., 196 the
court addressed whether coverage existed despite two exclusions in the pol-
icy, one dealing with claims under the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act ("LHWCA") and the other dealing with claims arising
out of or in the course and scope of employment by the insured. The
LHWCA exclusion was found to be unambiguous. '97 The court rejected
arguments that the underlying negligence claim was the controlling factor in
determining whether the exclusion applied.198 The court reasoned that the
only policy requirements necessary to bar coverage focused on whether the
loss arose out of the injury and whether the injury was covered under the
186. Id. at 632.
187. Id. at 633.
188. Id. at 632.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 633 (discussing Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 635(Tex. 1973); Baldwin v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 750 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1988, writ denied)).
192. Id. at 633.
193. 777 S.W.2d 442, 443-44 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
194. 786 F. Supp. at 633.
195. 777 S.W.2d at 444.
196. 948 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1991).




LHWCA. 199 The court also found that language in the exclusion limiting its
applicability to claims brought by the injured "employee or any third party"
does not require that the individual in question actually be an employee of
the insured. 2°° The court noted that the policy terms contain only a general
reference to the type of claimant and that to interpret the policy as suggested
by the insured would result in the failure of the court to follow the rules of
contract construction to the effect that the language must be given its ordi-
nary meaning. 20
The court also found that Exclusion (j) under the policy 20 2 was "specifi-
cally tailored to injuries sustained in the course of employment by the in-
sured. '20 3 The court found that this exclusion in the policy served to
reinforce that the LHWCA exclusion was applicable to all potential injured
employees, regardless of whether they were employees of the insured or
not. 2o4
F. PROPERTY DAMAGE/DUTY TO DEFEND
In Terra International, Inc. v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co.205
suit was brought against the insurer for violations of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, common law fraud, negligence and declaratory relief.
Several insurance policies were at issue in Terra. Each of the policies had
similar requirements that there be "property damage. ' 20 6 The court empha-
sized that the focus of review in determining the duty to defend was on the
"factual allegations in the complaint, not on the legal theories asserted. '20 7
The underlying suit against the insured asserted that the insured had sold
land that was not disclosed to be within the county flood control district.
The insured then caused the sale of flood control bonds by the district, which
resulted in enormous increases in the claimant's taxes and enormous de-
creases in the value of the claimant's land. The court held that there were no
allegations in the complaint showing potential liability for "physical injury
to or destruction of tangible property," the operative terms of the definition
of "property damage. '208 The court also found that there were no claims of
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 952.
202. This exclusion provided coverage that did not apply to "any obligation for which the
Insured or any carrier as his insurer may be held liable under any workman's compensation,
unemployment compensation or disability benefits law, or under any similar law." Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 829 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
206. The definition of "property damage" was as follows:
(1) Physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during
the policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting there-
from, or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically in-
jured or destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during
the policy period.
Id. at 272.
207. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Hall, 761 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990)).
208. Id. at 273.
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"loss of use of tangible property" within the meaning of the term.2° 9 The
court noted that numerous other jurisdictions had refused to find that the
mere fact that a negligent misrepresentation theory was asserted against the
insurer somehow satisfied the "property damage" requirements of the
policy. 2 10
The court's discussion of the standard for determining the duty to defend
in Terra is troubling and incorrect. The court uses a "potential liability" test
for determining the duty to defend. While this test did not affect the result,
the reference to "potential liability" in prior case law, relied upon by the
court in Terra, was in no way intended to adopt the "clairvoyance" rule
followed in other jurisdictions.211 Under the clairvoyance or "spandex" ap-
proach, if the facts alleged could potentially be used to develop a theory that
would in fact be covered under the policy, even though that specific legal
theory has not been plead, there is a duty to defend. 212 This approach has
been specifically rejected by Texas courts and other courts applying Texas
law.213 A dissenting opinion in Terra was entered by Justice Kinkeade, seiz-
ing upon the "potential liability" language utilized by the court.214 Without
question, the dissent relies on the "spandex" or clairvoyance rule. The dis-
sent reasoned that because allegations of wrongful acts other than misrepre-
sentation, particularly negligent performance of flood control work on the
property in question, could result in a claim for "physical injury to or de-
struction of tangible property," there was a duty to defend. 215 It is of vital
importance that the Texas Supreme Court resolve the loose and imprecise
use of the "potential liability" language found in some prior cases. Courts in
other jurisdictions have found the clairvoyance or "spandex" approach to be
both impractical and devastating. 216
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Snug Harbor Ltd. v. Zurich Insurance217
209. Id. (citing Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that allegations of economic loss resulting from the negligent
failure to locate an oil well on land did not involve "property damage"); General Ins. Co. of
America v. Western American Dev. Co., 603 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1979) (holding that allegations
of misrepresentation about the nature and extent of a public easement, resulting in a reduction
of the value of the property purchased, was not within the policy coverage)).
210. Id. (discussing McCollum v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 644 P.2d 283, 285 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that negligent misrepresentation allegations were not within the policy
coverage); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Blair, Ltd., 726 P.2d 1310, 1313 (1986) (holding that
allegation of diminution of "product-line" did not involve "loss of use of tangible property")).
211. R. B. Cooper & Michael W. Huddleston, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 329, 344-45, n.112 (1990).
212. Id.
213. Brooks, Tarleton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., 832 F.2d
1358, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1987) (Texas law) ("the proper question is not what could ... success-
fully have [been] pled," but what was "in fact pled"). See generally Baldwin v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 750 S.W.2d 919, 920-21 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied) (pleadings perme-
ated with allegations of "intentional" wrongdoing, which is not covered under the policy,
could not be negated by broad allegations of nuisance, which is covered under the policy as a
negligence-type claim).
214. 829 S.W.2d at 273-74.
215. Id. at 274.
216. Cooper & Huddleston, supra note 213, at 345 n. 112.
217. 968 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1992); see also discussion supra notes 76-86.
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closely paralleled the Terra International opinion. The insured, Snug Har-
bor, was sued by a person who was stabbed by a Snug Harbor employee
while at his home in a condominium project owned by Snug Harbor. On the
same day that notice of the suit was allegedly served on Snug Harbor, First
South, the holder of a mortgage on the Snug Harbor property, held a fore-
closure sale and took possession of the Snug Harbor premises. Snug Harbor
asserted that as a result of First South taking possession, it never received a
copy of the petition, resulting in a default judgment against it in the amount
of $500,000. Snug Harbor sued First South and its insurer, Zurich. First
South demanded that Zurich assume its defense and pay the default judg-
ment, but Zurich refused, asserting that Snug Harbor did not suffer "prop-
erty damage" within the meaning of the general liability policy. Zurich also
asserted that, even if Snug Harbor did suffer such property damage, the
damage was not caused by an "occurrence" within the policy period. Zurich
further asserted that any coverage otherwise applicable was excluded by the
policy's "care, custody and control" exclusion. 21 8 The trial court concluded
that Zurich's failure to defend was a bad faith breach of the duty to
defend. 2 19
The Fifth Circuit noted that it faced a question of first impression:
whether the mishandling of a document leading to the entry of a default
judgment constitutes "property damage. '220 It nevertheless found that the
volumes of case law interpreting the phrase showed that purely economic
loss was not "the loss of use of tangible property" under the policy. 22' Snug
Harbor relied on Lay v. Aetna Insurance,222 arguing that the Lay court's
statement that "tangible property" is commonly understood to be "property
that is capable of being handled or touched" 223 indicated that the petition
constituted "tangible property." The Fifth Circuit rejected this reading of
Lay. "Snug Harbor overlooks the fact that the Lay court, after making this
statement, went on to hold that purchase of an assignment of drilling rights
and payment of attorney and surveyor fees do not constitute injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of use of tangible property," the court stated. 224 The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the "petition and citation had no intrinsic value
or use beyond notifying Snug Harbor that legal action had commenced
against it," and therefore "[t]he substantive loss resulting from the alleged
mishandling of th[e] document was loss of th[e] notice," not a property loss
for purposes of the general liability policy.225
The court also found that there was no "occurrence" during the policy
218. Id. The Fifth Circuit did not reach this issue.
219. Id. at 541.
220. Id. at 542.
221. The policy definition of "property damage" is the same definition as that in Terra
International, Inc. v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co., 829 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1992, writ denied). See supra note 208.
222. 599 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (action brought
against insured for negligent location of oil well).
223. Snug Harbor, 968 F.2d at 543 (quoting Lay, 599 S.W.2d at 686).




period because 1) the alleged misplacement of the petition and citation oc-
curred two weeks before First South added itself to the Zurich policy that
had been originally purchased by Snug Harbor, and 2) the misplacement did
not become apparent until after the default judgment was entered, which
was more than two months after First South cancelled the Zurich policy. 226
The court reasoned that Texas courts had concluded that the time of an
occurrence was when a claimant sustains actual damages, not necessarily
when the act or omission causing the damage is committed. 227 It held that,
because the alleged loss of use of the citation and petition occurred during
the policy period, the manifestation of the loss did not, and therefore there
was no occurrence during the policy period.228
Judge Kent's dissent is similar to the troubling reasoning of the Terra
court with regard to the "potential liability" language found in some prior
cases. The dissent reasoned that, at the time Zurich decided not to defend
First South, Zurich did not have the benefit of the Fifth Circuit's decision on
whether it had a duty to defend Snug Harbor. 229 Additionally, there was
little if any case law available to guide Zurich's decision because the issue,
whether the mishandling of a legal document was "property damage," was
one of first impression. 230 He concluded that Snug Harbor's claim was at
least "potentially" covered by the Zurich policy and that, therefore, Zurich
had a duty to defend. 23'
G. RELITIGATION AND JURISDICTION
In Royal Insurance Co. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp.232 the Fifth Circuit dealt
with the collusive efforts of insureds and parties claiming damages against
them to avoid a prior declaratory judgment that held that the insurer had no
duty to defend or provide coverage for the claimants' allegations against the
insureds. The suit involved claims by investors against numerous Quinn-L
entities, the insureds, alleging that the investors had lost money in various
real estate investments offered or managed by Quinn-L. The investors as-
serted claims under federal securities and anti-racketeering laws as well as
Texas law. These claims were consolidated into a single federal liability suit.
Quinn-L asked Royal, the insurer, to defend the suit. Royal agreed but re-
served its right to contest coverage and subsequently filed a declaratory judg-
ment action. While Royal's motion for summary judgment was pending, the
investors and Quinn-L's sole shareholder, Lovell, entered into a settlement
agreement. Lovell promised to cooperate with the investors in the litigation
against Quinn-L and to assign them any claims he might have against Royal,
while the investors in return, promised not to pursue any claims against him.
226. Id. at 544.
227. Id. (citing Dorchester Dev. Corp. v. Safeco Ins., 737 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.-





232. 960 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1992).
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The court granted Royal's partial summary judgment motion, concluding
that Royal's policies did not impose any duty to defend or indemnify Quinn-
L because there was no injury to tangible property that could constitute an
"occurrence," none of the losses constituted "property damage" as required
by the policy, and personal injuries in the form of mental anguish were not
shown to have been caused by an "occurrence. '233 Thereafter, the investors
dismissed the federal liability suit. The federal claims were dismissed with
prejudice and the pendant state claim without prejudice. 234 Five days after
the final judgment was entered on the declaratory judgment action, the in-
vestors again filed suit against Quinn-L in state court in Dallas County,
based on the same events and conduct as in the just-dismissed federal liabil-
ity suit. Quinn-L rejected Royal's offer of a defense under reservation of
rights. Quinn-L cooperated with the investors, resulting in deemed admis-
sions and a default judgment against Quinn-L in the amount of
$741,000,000.235 The judgment recited that this amount consisted of dam-
ages for bodily injury including mental pain, suffering and anguish that had
manifested itself physically. 236 Quinn-L then assigned its rights and causes
of action against Royal to the investors, and the investors sued Royal in state
court in Cameron County as assignees of Quinn-L, bringing tort, waiver and
estoppel claims based upon Royal's handling of the previous state court liti-
gation, and as judgment creditors for recovery of the Dallas County judg-
ment under the insurance policies. Royal again filed suit in a federal court
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
Quinn-L in the Dallas County litigation. On Royal's motion, the federal
court issued a preliminary injunction against further prosecution of the
Cameron County litigation.237
The Fifth Circuit considered whether the preliminary injunction violated
the Anti-Injunction Act.238 The court had relied on two exceptions to the
Anti-Injunction Act in entering the injunction: (1) the exception for injunc-
tions necessary in aid of its jurisdiction with regard to the coverage issues
decided in the first declaratory judgment action, and (2) the exception for
injunctions to protect or effectuate its judgments with regard to the post-
declaratory judgment claims, which depended upon conduct and events that
occurred after the issuance of the first judgment. 239 The Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that the district court properly relied on the relitigation exception
with regard to the coverage claims, finding that minor differences in the
pleadings did not remove the new action from the ambit of the prior judg-
233. Id. at 1289.
234. Id. at 1290.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1291.
238. 960 F.2d at 1293; see 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (West 1978). This statute provides: "A court
of the United States may not grant an injunction to state proceedings in State court except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or for necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect
or effectuate its judgments."
239. Quinn-L, 960 F.2d at 1293.
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ment and holding that there was no coverage. 24° The court rejected the ap-
pellants' construction of the declaratory judgment as "artificial and
unnecessarily formalistic" and gave the decision "a more natural read-
ing."' 24 ' The court stated:
Based upon the language of the policy, there must be an occurrence and
an injury in order for there to be coverage. In this case, the district
court found that the investors' injury - as alleged in the complaint -
were not caused by an occurrence. Without an occurrence, there could
be no coverage, and thus there was no duty to defend. In sum, the
district court did not simply decide whether the investors had alleged
"injury" caused by an "occurrence" but instead necessarily to deter-
mine that the investors' allegations did not fit within the coverage of the
policy language. 242
Acknowledging the "complaint-allegation" rule followed by Texas courts,
the court stated that "simply because the duty to defend [was] to be deter-
mined on the face of the complaint, f not with reference to the truth or
falsity of the allegations contained therein, d[id] not mean that the preclusive
effect of a declaration of no duty to defend must be limited to the precise
allegations contained in the pleadings. '243 The Fifth Circuit held that the
district court's determination of the issue of coverage, that no "occurrence"
had befallen the investors within the terms of the policy, could be applied to
allegations in subsequent complaints. 244 Finding that the allegedly improper
acts on Quinn-L's part remained constant from the federal liability suit to
the Dallas County suit, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court's deter-
mination of the coverage issue disposed of the appellants' claim to recover
under the policy language, and therefore affirmed the district court's injunc-
tion of the direct contractual claims under the relitigation exception. 245
The court found, however, that the post-declaratory judgment claims were
improperly enjoined based on the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception.246
Royal argued that, due to the collusive behavior involved, the district court
should have been able to temporarily enjoin the Cameron County litigation
until the district court had an opportunity to sort through the complex
claims before it. While the Fifth Circuit stated that it was sympathetic to
Royal's position, the court held that the exception could not be stretched
that far.247 That exception was properly limited to situations where a state
proceeding threatened to dispose of property that formed the basis for fed-
eral in rem jurisdiction or where the state proceeding threatened the contin-
uing superintendence by a federal court.248
While the injunction was in effect, however, the district court had dis-
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1294-95.
242. Id. at 1295 (footnotes omitted).
243. Id. at 1295-96.
244. Id. at 1296.
245. Id. at 1297.
246. Id. at 1300.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1298.
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posed of the post-declaratory judgment claims adversely to the investors, 249
and they asked the Fifth Circuit to vacate all orders entered by the court
below during the pendency of the improperly issued preliminary injunction.
The Fifth Circuit declined to vacate the orders, noting that there had "al-
ways [been] the possibility that the federal court would win the race to judg-
ment," and that the equities did not weigh in the investors' favor, because
they had created "this tangled web of litigation by seeking to evade the effect
of the first declaratory judgment action" by bringing their claims to state
court and collusively obtaining a default judgment there.2 0
H. ADDITIONAL INSURED ENDORSEMENT
In Granite Construction Co. v. Bituminous Insurance Cos. 251 the court ad-
dressed a case of first impression regarding the interpretation of an addi-
tional insured endorsement. Under the terms of the endorsement, Granite
Construction Company was named as a "person insured" but only "with
respect to liability arising out of operations performed for such insured
[Granite] by or on behalf of the named insured [Brown]. ' 252 The court
found that the endorsement unambiguously supported the proposition that
Granite was to be afforded coverage for claims against it based upon the
actions of Brown.253 Here, the claims were based solely on the obligation
and acts of Granite. Accordingly, the court found that there was no cover-
age under the endorsement. 25 4 Further, the court rejected arguments that
the certificate of insurance somehow created an ambiguity.255 The certificate
stated that Granite was an additional named insured for all of its work in
Texas. The court concluded that this certificate could not create an ambigu-
ity because the insurance afforded to Granite was provided by the insurance
policies, not by the certificate of insurance.25 6
I. SETTLEMENT
In Judwin Properties, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.257 USF be-
gan a defense of its insured, Judwin, in lawsuits for personal injuries alleg-
edly caused by Judwin's application of chlordane in its rental properties.
Two years after assuming the defense, USF advised Judwin that it would
continue to provide a defense to the lawsuit, but that the defense would be
subject to a reservation of rights. USF never refused to defend Judwin and
provided defense counsel through settlement. USF settled two of the law-
suits in 1990 for $6,000,000, in return for a covenant not to execute against
Judwin and the other insureds under the policy, a covenant not to execute
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1300-01.
251. 832 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, n.w.h.).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 430.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 434.
257. 973 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1992).
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against USF, and a release of bad faith claims against USF. The plaintiffs in
those lawsuits had received the bad faith claims against USF from Judwin in
a settlement several months before, which Judwin had made because it be-
lieved USF to be derelict in its duty to defend and settle with those plaintiffs.
Judwin retained a monetary interest in the outcome of the bad faith lawsuits.
After USF settled with those plaintiffs, Judwin filed suit against USF alleg-
ing that USF breached its insurance contract by failing to defend Judwin
properly and failing to settle with the plaintiffs at an earlier time. A federal
district court entered a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of USF. 258
The court held that USF acted properly in paying its policy limits to settle
the cases against all of its insureds, including Judwin, and that it had no
obligation to defend Judwin after it had paid its policy limits.259
J. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
In State Farm & Casualty Co. v. Wade26° the Corpus Christi court of
appeals reversed the dismissal of State Farm's petition for declaratory relief.
State Farm had sought to obtain (1) an interpretation of a business pursuit
exclusion in a personal boatowner's liability policy and (2) a declaration that
State Farm did not owe a duty to defend a lawsuit pending against the estate
of one of its insureds. The exclusion precluded coverage for an occurrence
that took place while the boat was being used for business pursuits. The
petition stated that the boat was being used at the time of the accident, but
made no reference to whether it was being used for business purposes or not.
The court found that, where the pleadings were silent or neutral about facts
that would establish the applicability or inapplicability of a policy exclusion,
the court could consider extrinsic evidence of those facts. 261 The court also
held that the trial court erred in dismissing State Farm's suit because its
petition stated a cause of action for which relief may be granted. 262 It noted
that Texas courts "recognize an insurance company's ability to bring a de-
claratory judgment action to determine whether it has a duty to defend an
insured prior to determination of liability in the underlying lawsuit. '263
Thus, the insured's special exceptions were improperly sustained. 264
258. Id. at 434.
259. Id. at 436.
260. 827 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
261. Id. at 452-53. The court cited International Serv. Ins. Co. v. Boll, 392 S.W.2d 158
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1965, writ refd n.r.e.) (suit brought by insurance com-
pany following defense in underlying suit, not declaratory judgment action); Cook v. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co., 488 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ) (where an auto policy
contained an exclusion for damages arising when insured drove automobile owned by a relative
residing in the same house, the court could look at extrinsic evidence to determine whether the
driver was a relative residing in the insured's house).
262. 827 S.W.2d at 453.
263. Id. at 450 (citing Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d




III. HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE
A. DATE OF OCCURRENCE OR TRANSACTION
Determining the date of the occurrence or transaction upon which a suit is
based was the issue before the court in Jackson v. Downey.265 Jackson was a
mandamus proceeding where the underlying suit involved a claim for breach
of a duty of good faith and fair dealing against an insurer for the denial of
health benefits to its insured. The guardian for the insured was seeking bene-
fits under the policy for severe and irreparable brain damage. Through wit-
ness discovery, the insurer sought a number of documents that predated the
mailing of the benefit denial letter to the insured. The insurer asserted the
party communications privilege to various claim file notes pursuant to Rule
166b(3)(d) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.266
The court then determined whether these notes fell within the party com-
munications privilege of Rule 166b(3)(d). The court accepted the insurer's
assertion, concluding that the date of the occurrence or transaction upon
which the suit is based was the date of the insurer's letter denying cover-
age.267 Relying upon the Austin court of appeals' opinion in Gilbert v.
Black,268 the court held that the refusal of coverage is the occurrence or
transaction upon which a bad faith cause of action or denial of benefits is
based.269 Specifically, the court held that [tlhe decision making process of
the insurer in deciding to deny the coverage, which may not be assignable to
a date certain, cannot itself be the occurrence since, unless and until the
insured is notified of the decision, there could be no possibility of
litigation." 270
B. MEDICAL BENEFITS FOR "ARTIFICIAL LIMBS"
Irion v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America27 1 involved the definition of
an "artificial limb," as it applied to a claim brought under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)272 for medical benefits. The ben-
eficiary of the group health plan suffered from an illness that required her to
265. 817 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding).
266. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(b)(3)(d). This rule contains the "party communications privi-
lege," which is comprised of three express elements:
d. Party Communications. Communications between agents or representa-
tives or the employees of a party to the action or communications between a
party and that party's agents, representatives or employees, when made subse-
quent to the occurrence or transaction upon which the suit is based and in con-
nection with the prosecution, investigation or defense of the particular suit, or in
anticipation of the prosecution or defense of the claims made a part of the pend-
ing litigation. This exemption does not include communications prepared by or
for experts that are otherwise discoverable.
267. 817 S.W.2d at 859.
268. 722 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, orig. proceeding).
269. 817 S.W.2d at 859.
270. Id. at 860.
271. 964 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1992).
272. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
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wear a wig. 2 7 3 The district court concluded that hair is a "limb" and that,
therefore, a wig would be an "artificial limb." The Fifth Circuit disagreed,
relying upon the common definition of "hair" and the medical definition of
"limb. ' 274 Because the group benefit plan did not specifically include wigs
within its scope of coverage, the court held that no coverage was afforded for
the subject claim. 275
The claimant then argued that Prudential had extended coverage beyond
the specific provisions of the policy because of an internal memorandum list-
ing expenses for which benefits had been paid that were not expressly item-
ized in the policy. This memorandum, however, did not identify wigs as an
additional benefit. The court therefore concluded that no act by Prudential
had extended coverage to the subject claim. 2 7 6
C. LIFE INSURANCE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
In Medlin v. Medlin277 the court was faced with apportioning insurance
proceeds upon the death of the owner of a life insurance policy and one of
the beneficiaries. The life insurance policy specifically listed two benefi-
ciaries who, upon the death of the insured, would each receive fifty percent
of the proceeds. One beneficiary was the insured's wife and the other was his
mother. The insured and his wife died at approximately the same time. The
question was whether the remaining proceeds went to the other beneficiary,
the insured's mother, or his children. 278 The children argued that because
the mother was specifically listed as having a fifty percent interest in the
insurance proceeds, that it was the intent of the insured to give his mother
only fifty percent. They therefore argued that they were entitled to the re-
maining proceeds.
The court construed the beneficiary clause of the policy as providing that
the proceeds were to be payable to a designated beneficiary, and because the
mother was the only remaining beneficiary, she was entitled to the entire
proceeds. 279 The court therefore concluded that the fifty percent designation
in the policy was surplusage, because if both beneficiaries had survived the
273. The illness is known as alopecia areata totalis, which resulted in the total loss of hair
on the beneficiary's head.
274. 964 F.2d at 464-65 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1020 (1981); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 877 (25th ed. 1989); DORLAND'S ILLUS-
TRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 936 (27th ed. 1988)).
275. 964 F.2d at 465.
276. Id.
277. 830 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ denied).
278. Id. at 354.
279. Id. at 353-54. The beneficiary clause of the policy provided in part:
Any sum becoming due on account of the death of an insured employee shall be
payable to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee ... pro-
vided that if any designated beneficiary predeceases the employee, the share
which such beneficiary would have received if living shall, except as may be
otherwise specifically provided by the employee, be payable equally to the re-




deceased, each would automatically have been entitled to one-half of the
proceeds. 280 Accordingly, the court awarded the entire proceeds to the
mother.28' The court noted that this was a case of first impression in Texas,
but relied upon Osborn v. Insurance Company of North America28 2 in making
its decision.
D. LAPSE OF LIFE POLICY FOR NON-PAYMENT OF PREMIUM
In Walker v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. 283 the issue was whether
a life insurance policy had lapsed because a monthly premium was not paid
when due. 284 Kemper had issued an insurance policy to Jimmy Walker, the
plaintiff's late husband. The plaintiff was named as the beneficiary in the
policy. Walker elected to pay premiums monthly under Kemper's pre-au-
thorized draft policy, under which Kemper would draw a draft on Mr.
Walker's designated bank account for the premium. The premiums had
been paid through November 30, 1986. When the next draft for the Decem-
ber payment was made, the bank did not pay the draft, and returned the
request to Kemper with the notation "Payment Stopped."
Testimony at trial indicated that Kemper initially accepted the draft, but
then reversed the transaction when there were not sufficient funds to fulfill
the draft. Plaintiff argued that this initial acceptance by Kemper resulted in
an acceptance of the draft and therefore the policy did not lapse. However,
the premium was not paid within the 31-day grace period. Plaintiff also
argued that because there was no provision for the policy to forfeit ipso facto
for non-payment, the policy was in force and effect. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling that the policy had terminated as a matter of
law because the premium had not been paid in accordance with the provi-
sions of the policy.285 The court relied upon the well-settled rule in Texas
that payment of premiums in accordance with the provisions of a life insur-
ance policy is a condition precedent to the insurer's liability. 286
E. EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT
In Holder v. Prudential Insurance Co. ofAmerica287 the Fifth Circuit held
that evidence was sufficient to support a finding that high-dose chemother-
apy coupled with autologous bone marrow transplantation to treat a pa-
tient's breast cancer was an experimental treatment and therefore fell within
a health insurance policy's exclusion for treatment that was not reasonably
280. Id. at 355.
281. Id.
282. 490 P.2d 726 (Utah 1971).
283. 828 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
284. Id. at 445.
285. Id. at 449.
286. Id. (citing Zuniga v. Allstate Ins. Co., 693 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, no writ); Schultz v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 142 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1940, writ dism'd); National Aid Life Ass'n v. Driskill, 138 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1940, no writ)).
287. 951 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1992).
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necessary for medical care. For the treatment to be reasonably necessary,
the policy required that a treatment be ordered by a doctor, customarily
recognized as appropriate, and not experimental in nature. The procedure in
question was not considered experimental in the treatment of certain other
cancers, but it was still being investigated for the treatment of stage IV meta-
static breast cancer at the time it was used in the patient's treatment. Also,
the evidence showed that the protocol used on this patient was given to only
twenty or thirty women nationwide and was regulated by the FDA. More-
over, the patient had signed a consent form describing the treatment as an
"experimental study." The Fifth Circuit found that the trial court's decision
in favor of the insurer was not clearly erroneous. 281
F. FORFEITURE OF LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. White289 a widower who had been
convicted of his wife's murder appealed a federal district court decision that
held that under Texas law the widower had forfeited his interest in the pol-
icy due to the murder conviction. The wife had been the named insured
under a group life insurance policy issued by Metropolitan under the Federal
Employees Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA), 290 and the widower con-
tended that Texas law could not be used to disqualify him from a federal
statutory right granted him under the FEGLIA. The Fifth Circuit stated
that the FEGLIA should be interpreted consistent with state terms defining
domestic relations. 29' The court held that "[e]ven if the homicide forfeiture
rule were not the type of state domestic relations law that supplements the
FEGLIA, that would not be dispositive... because the federal common law
provides the same bar to recovery of life insurance proceeds by the murderer
of the insured. '292
G. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ERISA
In Hogan v. Kraft Foods293 a former employee and his wife sued an insurer
who had issued five annuity insurance policies to the trustees of the em-
ployer's employee pension plan to fund accrued retirement benefits, com-
plaining of the insurer's denial of his request to cash in or receive a lump
sum payment on the policies. They asserted that several co-employees had
been allowed to take such payments and alleged violations of the ERISA,294
contending that the insurer had denied them rights under the terms of the
plan and breached its fiduciary duties. They also asserted pendent state
288. Id. at 91.
289. 972 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, No. 92-7281, 1993 WL 23029 (March 8,
1993).
290. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (1988).
291. 972 F.2d at 124 (citing Spearman v. Spearman, 482 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1973); see also
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
292. 972 F.2d at 124 (citing New York Mut. Life Ins, Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591
(1886); Moore v. Moore, 186 S.E.2d 531 (1971); Annotation, 27 A.L.R.3d 794, 802 (1969)).
293. 969 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1992).
294. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
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claims including breach of contract, violation of article 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code,2 95 violation of the DPTA, 296 a breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court held that the state law claims were pre-empted by ERISA because
all of the state law claims were based on the insurer's refusal to make a lump
sum payment of benefits under the Employee Pension Benefit Plan, and thus
were analogous to other state law claims that had previously been found to
have been pre-empted by ERISA.297 The court then held that the ERISA
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations for raising a
breach of fiduciary duty, applying the state statute of limitations most analo-
gous to the cause of action raised, which the court determined to be the four
year Texas statute governing a suit sounding in contract. 298 Because the
claimants had actual notice of the breach when the claim for a lump sum
payment was denied in March 1985 and did not file suit until August 1989,
their claim was time-barred. 299
IV. PROPERTY
A. SUBROGATION
In Interstate Fire Insurance Co. v. First Tape, Inc. 300 an insurer of leased
premises paid $600,000 to its insured, the lessor of leased premises, after a
fire loss. The lease entered into by lessor and the lessee, First Tape, provided
that the parties released each other from any and all claims for fire loss to
premises that were insurable, including loss caused by the negligence of the
parties to the lease. The lease also included a clause stating that the parties
to the lease agreed that their respective insurance companies would have no
right of subrogation against the other on account of such a loss. The insurer
alleged that First Tape lost all right to assert the waiver of subrogation
clause because it had assigned the lease to another party before the loss.
The Houston court of appeals rejected this argument. It held that a
"lessee-assignor transfers title and the entire interest in the leasehold estate,
destroying the privity of estate between the lessor and the lessee-assignor...
[but] the assignor's liability on the contract remains, unless [the assignor] is
expressly released from the obligation by the lessor."' 30 ' The court stated
that the lessor had no claim to assert, and so the insurer had no claim to
which it could be subrogated. 302
295. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
296. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1988).
297. 969 F.2d at 144 (citing Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir.
1989); Boren v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029
(1990); Hermann Hospital v. M.E.B.A. Medical & Benefit Plan, 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1988)).
298. 969 F.2d at 144 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon
1986)).
299. 969 F.2d at 145.
300. 817 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).





In Watts v. St. Katherine Insurance Co. 303 the owner of an apartment
building had a judgment entered against it in a tax suit. The property was
damaged in a fire three days after it was sold at a sheriff's sale. The insurer
asserted that the former owner did not have an insurable interest in the
property, either because its interest was limited to a right of redemption after
the sheriff's sale or because there was a change in ownership and an in-
creased hazard to the property, both of which were conditions that sus-
pended or restricted coverage under the policy.
The Beaumont court of appeals rejected both of these arguments. It held
that even a right of redemption was an interest in property, the value of
which was affected by destruction of the property, and therefore the former
owner continued to have an insurable interest. 304 The court also rejected the
argument that the sheriff's sale was an increased hazard to the property as a
matter of law, stating that such an assertion presupposed that an insured
would commit a first-degree felony in the event of a tax sale. 30 5 Finally, the
court also rejected the argument that a change of ownership had occurred
for the purpose of triggering a contract clause requiring notice of a change of
ownership to be given to the insurer because the contract clause was not
triggered until the previous owner's redemption period expired. 306
C. PROOF OF Loss
The Dallas court of appeals held in Commonwealth Lloyd's Insurance Co.
v. Thomas307 that a defective proof of loss was not a basis for denying a
claim where the disputed proof of loss applied only to the contents of the
house, and where the house itself, which was also insured under the same
policy, had been destroyed by the fire. Even if the proof of loss was defec-
tive, the insurer had no basis for denial of the entire claim, the court held.308
D. ARSON AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY INTEREST
In Webster v. State Farm Fire & -Casualty Co. 309 the court considered
whether an innocent spouse could collect one-half of the insurance proceeds
for the fire loss of a house when the other spouse committed arson, where
the couple was divorced after the fire but before suing the fire insurer. In
1987, one year after the Websters separated, their home was destroyed by
fire. The house and contents were still community property. They filed a
claim with State Farm, which was denied. Their divorce, which was filed
during the claims process, became final in 1988 and the decree awarded
them each one-half undivided interest in the realty where the house had been
303. 820 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
304. Id. at 260-61.
305. Id. at 261.
306. Id. at 261-62.
307. 825 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.).
308. Id. at 144.
309. 953 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1992).
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located and one-half the net insurance proceeds from the fire loss. Later
they sued State Farm for breach of contract. Mrs. Webster contended that,
whether or not her husband was responsible for the fire, she was entitled to
recover her half of the proceeds.
The Texas Supreme Court partially abandoned its long-standing rule
prohibiting co-insureds from recovering insurance proceeds when one of
them deliberately destroyed jointly owned property in Kulubis v. Texas
Farm Bureau Underwriters Insurance Co. 310 in 1986. Kulubis held that "the
illegal destruction of jointly owned property by one co-insured shall not bar
recovery under an insurance policy by an innocent co-insured."131' The
Kulubis case, however, involved a wife who owned an undivided one-half
interest in the house in question as separate property. The Fifth Circuit sub-
sequently addressed the issue of an innocent spouse's right to recover when
the property was community property in Norman v. State Farm Fire & Cas-
ualty Co. 312 In that case the Fifth Circuit denied recovery to the innocent
co-insured whose community property was destroyed by her husband due to
the potential for wrongdoers to benefit from their wrongs.313
Noting that because the Websters were divorced, Mr. Webster would re-
ceive no benefits should State Farm reimburse Mrs. Webster for her loss, the
Fifth Circuit nevertheless followed Norman in refusing recovery for Mrs.
Webster. 314 It pointed out that at all points of time pertinent to State
Farm's decision to deny recovery, including the date the policy was issued,
the date of the fire, the date the Websters filed their claim and the date the
claim was refused, the property was community property, and the husband
and wife never filed individual proofs of loss or requested that the insurer
consider their interests as separate. 315 Although it conceded that the result
was harsh, the court held that the insurer had no means of predicting mari-
tal failures, and did not breach its contract by denying coverage. 316
E. RES JUDICATA
In Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Ryan317 an insurance company sued its
insured, seeking to recover from him money it had paid to his mortgagee
following a fire loss to his home. In a previous lawsuit, the insurer had ob-
tained a judgment that the insured intentionally set the fire and that it had
no obligation to indemnify him. During the course of the prior suit, the
mortgagee had intervened, seeking payment as a loss payee, and the insurer
had paid the money into the district court's registry. Following the judg-
ment, this money was paid to the mortgagee. In the insurer's subsequent
suit for recovery of that money from the insured, the insured argued that the
310. 706 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1986).
311. Id. at 955.
312. 804 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1986).
313. 804 F.2d at 1366.
314. 953 F.2d at 223.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 224.
317. 824 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, n.w.h.).
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insurer could not seek the money at that time because it could have sought
an award of that sum in the original lawsuit.
The Fort Worth court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judg-
ment for the insured. 31 8 It held that the cause of action asserted by the
insurer in the second case was quite different from its earlier claim, in that its
purpose in the original proceeding was to determine whether the insured
intentionally set fire to his insured house, while in the second the purpose
was to recover money from the insured based on the insurer's subrogation
rights.319 Moreover, the court noted, the issue of the insured's mortgage
debt was never raised against him in the original proceeding, and therefore
was never adjudicated. 320 The court also rejected the argument that the sub-
rogation claim was a compulsory counterclaim to the original action, be-
cause, it reasoned, the action was not mature and owned by the insurer at
the time of the filing of the answer in that suit, because it had not even paid
the mortgagee at that time.321 Thus, the court held, the subrogation claim
was merely a permissive counterclaim with regard to the earlier action. 322
V. AGENCY
A. CANCELLATION OF CONTRACTS
The San Antonio court of appeals upheld a court order dismissing a for-
mer insurance agent's cause of action against an insurer that canceled his
agency contract in Linick v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co. 323 The court
applied article 21.11-1, section 5, of the Texas Insurance Code, 324 relating to
the cancellation of agency contracts by fire and casualty insurance compa-
nies, in its determination that the dismissal of the agent's suit by the trial
court was not error because the agent had failed to obtain a finding by the
State Board of Insurance that Employers had violated article 21.11-1 prior
to the filing of his lawsuit. 325
The Linick court noted that the business of insurance has long been
closely regulated in the State of Texas, and that such regulation is within the
state's police power because that business is affected by public interest. 326
Also, the legislature has assumed control of the contractual relationship be-
tween insurance agents and companies. Further, the legislature may dele-
318. Id.
319. Id. at 238.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 239.
322. Id.
323. 822 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
324. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.11-1, § 5 (Vernon 1981).
325. This section reads as follows:
If it is found, after notice and an opportunity to be heard as determined by the
board, that an insurance company has violated this article, the insurance com-
pany shall be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 nor more than
$10,000, and it shall be subject to a civil suit by the agent for damages suffered
because of the premature termination of the contract by the company.
Id.
326. 822 S.W.2d at 299-300.
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gate its police power to administrative agencies such as the State Board of
Insurance. The court held that a reading of the clear terms of article 21.11-1
requires a preliminary finding by the State Board of Insurance as a prerequi-
site to the institution of a suit for damages resulting from a statutory cause
of action. 327
B. NATURE OF CONTRACT AND RELATIONSHIP
In Johnson v. Walker 328 the Fort Worth court of appeals considered a
dispute between an agent, Johnson, and the owner of an insurance business,
Walker, who were the parties to a general agent's contract. Walker filed suit
for declaratory judgment to determine the contractual rights of the parties,
and Johnson counterclaimed for fraud, violations of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, violations of the Texas Insurance Code, breach of fidu-
ciary duty and breach of contract. Johnson also sought to pierce the corpo-
rate veil. The trial court granted summary judgment for Walker. 329
Johnson asserted that his claims were not barred by the statute of limita-
tions because his suit on the agency contract was a suit on an open account,
as payments were to be made monthly and, he argued, the contract was
divisible. The court observed that the agency contract was one whereby
Johnson was to market Walker's insurance policies, similar to an employ-
ment contract wherein an employee receives commissions, as opposed to one
where the performance by one party consists of several distinct items, with
the price apportioned to each item.330 Under such a contract, the court
noted, the breach occurs when the employee is demoted or terminated, not
when the letter of termination is received. 3 31 The court also determined that
Johnson's contract with Walker was not divisible since it contemplated
agreement to the entire bundle of rights and duties.3 32 The court concluded,
therefore, that Johnson's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
3 33
Johnson also argued that the summary judgment was error because he
was a "consumer" under the terms of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.3 34 The Court rejected this argument because Johnson was simply
Walker's agent in selling insurance policies and did not contract with
Walker to purchase goods or services. 335
C. SCOPE OF AGENCY FOR TITLE INSURER
A lender brought a lawsuit against Stewart Title, a title insurer, for dam-
327. Id. at 299.
328. 824 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
329. Initially, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to Walker based on all of
Johnson's counterclaims with the exception of his breach of contract claim. However, because
Johnson failed to replead his breach of contract claim as requested by the trial court, the court
eventually entered an amended final judgment disposing of all of Johnson's claims. Id. at 186.




334. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
335. 824 S.W.2d at 187.
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ages the lender sustained when a buyer defaulted on a real estate loan in
Cameron County Savings Association v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. 336 The
lender's position was based on the argument that Valley Abstract, the title
company that closed the transaction, was the agent for Stewart Title. 337
Stewart Title argued that Valley Abstract was only its agent for the issuance
of the Stewart Title insurance policy. The lender's case was based on allega-
tions that Valley Abstract had manipulated the closing documents to hide
the fact that the buyer made no down payment. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of the title insurer. 338
The lender argued that a title company is a title insurer's agent because a
title insurance agent's duties in the escrow process and in facilitating the
closing of real estate transactions are an integral part of the business of title
insurance. The lender asserted that article 9.02(b) of the Texas Title Insur-
ance Code339 mandates that the duties of an agent's escrow officer in closing
the real estate transaction is part of its responsibilities as an agent of the title
insurer. However, the court held that, as a matter of law, the statute does
not impose liability on the title insurer beyond the title insurance policy's
coverage.34O
The court also considered whether there was a fact issue as to whether
Valley Abstract had actual or apparent authority from Stewart Title to close
the entire real estate transaction. It found that Valley Abstract did not have
actual authority to do so based on an affidavit by a Stewart Title representa-
tive stating that Valley Abstract was never an agent for Stewart Title for any
purpose other than execution of its title insurance policies. 34' In addition,
the court held that Stewart Title did not hold Valley Abstract out to the
public as trustworthy or reliable in closing real estate transactions, and that
the only business conducted by Stewart Title was title insurance. 342 Fur-
thermore, the only authority given to Valley Abstract in the contract be-
tween the parties was the authority to execute title insurance policies.343
The court, relying on deposition testimony of a loan officer for the lender
and the closer for Valley Abstract, also held that Valley Abstract had no
apparent authority from Stewart Title to close the entire real estate transac-
tion.34 Therefore, the court held that summary judgment for the title in-
surer was proper. 345
336. 819 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
337. A default judgment was taken against the title company that closed the transactions.
However, the title insurer was the only defendant involved in the appeal.
338. 819 S.W.2d at 601.
339. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.02(b) (Vernon 1981).
340. 819 S.W.2d at 602.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 603.
343. Id.
344. Id.




In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. GroS346 the insured homeowners, Lee
and Sharon Gros, brought a lawsuit against their homeowners insurer to
recover for damages their home sustained as a result of a landslide. After a
jury trial, judgment was rendered for the insureds. State Farm and its agent,
Goss, appealed. 347
The key issue in the litigation related to representations made by Goss. 348
Initially, the court considered whether the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to support a finding that Goss misrepresented the benefits or
terms of the homeowner's policy. The insured testified that when he had
made an earlier claim under the policy for removal of boulders that had
fallen into the driveway but had not damaged the house, agent Goss told
him that there was no coverage for removal of the boulders but that the
policy would have covered the damage if the boulders had actually "hit" the
house. Agent Goss denied making this statement but failed to make a writ-
ten record of her version of the conversation. After their house was dam-
aged at a later date by a landslide that actually hit the house, the insureds
testified, they called in the claim to State Farm, using the language agent
Goss had told them would invoke coverage under the policy. However,
State Farm denied the claim based on the landslide exclusion, the inherent
vice exclusion and the surface waters exclusion. Based on this evidence, the
court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury finding that
Goss misrepresented the benefits or terms of the homeowners policy.
349
The court also considered whether there was sufficient evidence to support
the jury finding that State Farm committed an unfair or deceptive act or
practice by misrepresenting the benefits or terms of the policy.350 Holding
that the evidence revealed that Goss was acting as an agent for State Farm
and that State Farm was therefore bound by her actions, the court deter-
mined that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury finding that State
Farm misrepresented the terms or benefits of the homeowner's policy.351
Further, the court found that the misrepresentation evidence was sufficient
to support a finding that State Farm engaged in an unconscionable action or
course of action. 352
State Farm also challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury findings that the unconscionable course of conduct and
misrepresentations by State Farm and Goss were a producing cause of the
damages sustained by the insured. State Farm argued that even if Goss had
misrepresented the coverage of the insured's homeowner's policy, such mis-
representation was not a producing cause of damage because the insured
would have been unable to obtain insurance coverage covering this type of
346. 818 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
347. Id. at 910.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 912.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 913.
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claim from any other insurance company. However, the court held, it was
not necessary for the insureds to prove that the promised coverage could
have been obtained from another insurer in order to establish producing
cause where a suit alleges violations of the DTPA 353 as well as article 21.21
of the Texas Insurance Code.354 Further, the court noted, had the insureds
known that they would not be covered for damages caused by a landslide,
the insureds might have taken other steps to prevent their loss, such as test-
ing the retaining wall before it collapsed and caused the landslide. 355
E. AUTHORITY TO BIND COVERAGE
In Maccabees Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. McNie1356 an insurer argued
that the trial court erred in concluding that its agent, who allegedly repre-
sented to a would-be insured hospital district that he had authority to bind
group life insurance coverage as a representative of the insurer, acted with
actual, apparent and implied authority and that he possessed the authority
to bind coverage as the insurer's employee or agent. The insurer asserted
that the agent should be classified as a person soliciting an application for
life insurance without the power to waive, change or alter policy terms under
article 21.04 of the Insurance Code. 357 The court noted that the actual au-
thority of a soliciting agent to make representations on behalf of an insur-
ance company is much more limited than the authority possessed by a local
recording agent, which is co-extensive with the company's authority. 358
The court found that the record did not support the classification of the
agent as either a soliciting agent or a local recording agent, and held that the
trial court correctly classified him as an "agent of the company" under arti-
cle 21.02 of the Insurance Code. 359 The court stated that the record estab-
lished that the agent received an application, collected the premium and
acted in the course of negotiation of the insurance contract in the course of
his employment with the insurer. 360 It stated that the statutory authority
granted to an agent under article 21.02 does not authorize the agent to mis-
represent the policy coverage and bind the insurance company to his misrep-
resentations unless the insurance company approves the agent's conduct by
353. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987).
354. 818 S.W.2d at 912.
355. Id. at 914.
356. 836 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.).
357. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.04 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
358. 836 S.W.2d at 232 (citing Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d
688, 692-93 (Tex. 1979)).
359. 836 S.W.2d at 232. The court cited the relevant portion of the insurance code in a
footnote:
Any person who solicits insurance on behalf of any insurance company, whether
incorporated under the laws of this or any other state or foreign government, or
who takes or transmits other than for himself any application for insurance or
any policy of insurance to or from such company . . . shall be held to be the
agent of the company for which the act is done, or the risk is taken, as far as
relates to all the liabilities, duties, requirements and penalties set forth in this
Chapter.
Id. at n.5 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.02 (Vernon 1981)).
360. 836 S.W.2d at 232.
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authorizing his wrongful acts or subsequent ratification of those acts. 361 The
court also noted that if an agent or employee of an insurer is clothed with
the apparent authority to do an act or make a representation, then that in-
surer cannot later escape liability by asserting that the agent or employee
lacked the authority to engage in those acts. 362 Noting that the apparent
authority theory is based on the doctrine of estoppel, the court stated that in
order to successfully argue such a theory, the plaintiff must establish that the
principal's conduct would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that
the agent actually possessed the authority which he purported to exercise. 363
The court, however, concluded that in the case before it there was no
evidence that the agent had actual, apparent, or implied authority to bind
insurance coverage or to waive policy provisions.364 The court agreed with
the insurer that the trial court erred by concluding that the agent possessed
authority to bind coverage and had actual, apparent and implied authority
to do so. 36 5 The court further found that absent actual, apparent or implied
authority to bind coverage, the agent could not enter into a contract that
bound the insurer, and therefore there was no contract existing between the
insurer and the applicant. 366 It also concluded, however, that there was suf-
ficient evidence to support the trial court's judgment awarding damages
under section 16 of article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.367 It stated that in
article 21.02 agent of an insurance company who misrepresents coverage
may render the insurance company he represents vicariously liable for the
misrepresentations under the DTPA and article 21.21, section 16 of the In-
surance Code. 368 It noted that a State Board of Insurance regulation pro-
vided that the regulation's purpose was to further define and state the
standards necessary to prohibit deceptive acts or deceptive practices by in-
surers and insurance agents irrespective of "whether the person is acting as
an insurer, principal, agent, employer or employee, or in other capacity or
connection with such insurer. 369
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
It is now axiomatic that due process prevents a state court from exercising
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who otherwise have no
continuous and systematic presence in that state unless that defendant has
established "minimum contacts" with the forum and the exercise of personal
jurisdiction does not otherwise offend "traditional notions of fair play and
361. Id. (citing Royal Globe, 577 S.W.2d at 693).
362. 836 S.W.2d at 232.
363. Id. at 232-33.
364. Id. at 235.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981).
368. 836 S.W.2d at 233.




substantial justice. ' 370 Equally settled is the idea that "minimum contacts"
require that the non-resident purposefully evoke the benefits of the forum
state's law by performing some act or consummating some transaction
within or purposefully directed to that state.371 The Texas Supreme Court
recently issued two significant opinions applying the "minimum contacts"
analysis to non-resident insurers.372
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L. C.
involved an American insurer's action against an English insurer for reim-
bursement of sums paid by the American insurer to settle a wrongful death
claim against a common insured arising from an on-the-job accident in
Texas. 373 It was undisputed that the English insurer's liability policy was
negotiated, issued and, prior to the events involved in the underlying suit,
performed only in England. However, the policy named two American sub-
sidiaries as additional insureds and identified these entities as domiciled in
the United States. The policy also afforded all insureds coverage anywhere
in the world. Emphasizing the element of foreseeability of defending an ac-
tion in the forum state for purposes of deciding whether a non-resident in-
surer established "minimum contacts" in a jurisdiction where it otherwise
conducted no business activity, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that whether
amenability to suit was "foreseeable" depended on the nature of the insur-
ance coverage and the insurer's "awareness that it was responsible to cover
losses arising from a substantial subject of insurance regularly present in the
forum state."' 374 Under this test, the court concluded that the English in-
surer had established minimum contacts with Texas for the purposes of that
action because the additional insured's principal place of business was lo-
cated in Texas and because the claim at issue had arisen out of such addi-
tional insured's business activities in Texas. 375 The court reasoned that
because the liability policy obligated the English insurer to defend and in-
demnify covered claims anywhere in the world and because one of many
additional insureds was located in Texas, it could have reasonably antici-
pated the resolution of coverage disputes with and suits against the addi-
tional insured in Texas. 376
Nevertheless, the court declined to permit the trial court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the non-resident insurer on grounds rarely employed
to defeat potential in personam jurisdiction: It deemed the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction inconsistent with traditional notions of fair play and sub-
370. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985); Helicopteros Nacion-
ales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
371. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474-75; Schlobohm v. Shapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 358
(Tex. 1990); U-Anchor Advertising v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1063 (1977).
372. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. V. English China Clays, 815 S.W.2d 223
(Tex. 1992); El Paso Reyco, Inc. v. Malaysia British Assurance, 830 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1992).
373. Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 225.
374. Id. at 227.




stantial justice.3 77 The court determined that the interest of Texas in
adjudicating the dispute was "minimal" because the action was between two
insurers rather than an insurer and a Texas insured. 378 The court conceded
that had this been an insured-insurer dispute, the state would have had a
substantial interest in adjudicating the dispute in order to provide its resi-
dents with an effective means of redress against foreign insurers. 379 Indeed,
the court noted that because insurance is a subject regulated by the state for
the benefit of its insured citizens, a lesser degree of "contact" would never-
theless support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
insurer. 380 However, the court apparently concluded that a co-insurer was
not within the scope of persons protected by state regulations and, therefore,
the interests of Texas in this insurer-versus-insurer dispute did not outweigh
the burden on the foreign insurer of defending the reimbursement claim in
Texas . 38 1
Citing the holding in Guardian Royal that liability insurers establish
"minimum contacts" in any jurisdiction where the insured is amenable to
personal jurisdiction for an insured claim, the El Paso court of appeals ex-
tended this rule to non-resident reinsurers to hold them amenable to suit in
Texas when the claim arises from circumstances where the reinsured's in-
sured is subject to personal jurisdiction.382 Deeming reliance on Guardian
Royal a "misunderstand[ing ofl the nature of reinsurance," the Texas
Supreme Court by per curiam opinion in Malaysia British Assurance v. El
Paso Reyco, Inc. reversed the court of appeals and held that the non-resident
reinsurer was not amenable to jurisdiction in Texas solely on the basis of the
amenability of the reinsured's insured to suit in this state.383 The reinsurer
in Malaysia British had reinsured the liability risks underwritten by a Pakis-
tani insurer for a Texas insured. A Texas resident asserted a liability claim
against the insured which the Pakistani insurer refused to defend and, fol-
lowing judgment against the insured, to pay on the insured's behalf.
Both the insured and the judgment creditor sued the Pakistani insurer to
impose contractual and extracontractual liability claims and obtained a judg-
ment by default against the Pakistani insurer after it was placed in receiver-
ship. The judgment creditor and insured then brought suit against the
377. Id. at 233.
378. Id. at 232-33.
379. Id. at 233.
380. Id. at 229.
381. Id. at 229, 233. Justice Mauzy dissented from this portion of the opinion. Id. at 233-
34. He urged quite cogently that the American insurer who contributed to the settlement
should be treated as if it were the insured Texas citizen because the American insurer had,
upon contribution to the settlement, been subrogated, to the extent of the contribution, to the
rights of the insured. Id. at 234. Under Justice Mauzy's analysis, because the rights being
asserted were the same rights as those that the state's insurance regulations were designed to
protect, the identity of the person asserting those rights should have no bearing upon the
decision whether the state's regulatory interests outweighed the burden on the non-resident
insurer to defend the action in a remote jurisdiction. Id.
382. El Paso Reyco, Inc. v. Malaysia British Assurance, 808 S.W.2d 529, 530-31 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991), rev'd per curiam, 830 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1992).
383. 830 S.W.2d at 921.
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reinsurer alleging that it breached its reinsurance treaty with the Pakistani
insurer and that such conduct breached the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing as well as violated the consumer protection provisions of article 21.21 of
the Insurance Code384 and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.385 By
affidavit, the reinsurer established that it had no connection with Texas
whatsoever other than its agreement executed outside the United States to
reinsure some of the insurer's policies, including that issued to a Texas domi-
ciliary. 386 Holding that this agreement was inadequate to establish "mini-
mum contacts" between the reinsurer and Texas, the Texas Supreme Court
explained that the reinsurer only agreed to cover losses sustained by the
Pakistani insurer, not the losses sustained by that insurer's insureds. 387 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that, unlike an insurer who insures a Texas
resident, the reinsurer engaged in no activity purposefully directed to
Texas.388 Instead, it deemed the activity of the reinsured Pakistani insurer
the type of "unilateral activity of a third person" insufficient to confer per-
sonal jurisdiction over the reinsurer. 389
B. FIDELITY & PERFORMANCE BONDS
Fidelity and performance bonds were the subject of two cases decided
under Texas law in 1992.390 In Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Concerned Taxpay-
ers, Inc. ,391 a bonding company issued statutory public official bonds to five
trustees of a purported hospital district. A taxpayer's group prevailed in a
suit in which the hospital district was found to have been formed in violation
of the Texas constitution and the trustees were declared to have violated the
Open Meetings Act.392 In addition, the trial court awarded attorney's fees
to the taxpayer's group. 393 Because the hospital district had no funds, the
taxpayer's group sought to recover the attorney's fee award under the public
officials' bond, which obligated the bonding company to pay up to the stated
limits of the bond damages based upon "the unfaithful performance of the
trustees in their official capacities. '394
The bonding company first urged that it was not liable because surety
bonds have historically been construed to impose no obligation to reimburse
the claimant for attorney's fees absent a statutory or contractual provisions
to the contrary. The court rejected this contention because the award of
attorney's fee was specifically authorized under the Declaratory Judgment
384. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
385. TEX. Bus. & CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987).
386. 830 S.W.2d at 920.
387. Id. at 921.
388. Id.
389. Id. (citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475; Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 475).
390. Geters v. Eagle Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1992); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Con-
cerned Taxpayers, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
391. 829 S.W.2d 923.






Act.395 Further, the court rejected the notion that the precepts of interpret-
ing surety bonds were applicable to the broad language and purpose of fidel-
ity bonds because the latter are construed under the more liberal rules of
construction applicable to insurance contracts. 396 The court also rejected
the bond issuer's contention that the trustees never performed, unfaithfully
or otherwise, any statutory duties because of the irregular formation of the
board. 397 The court, without explanation of how a public body, never dele-
gated powers in violation of the constitution, could acquire statutory author-
ity, held that each meeting of the trustees convened in violation of the open
meetings law was an "unfaithful act" which invoked the issuer's liability
under its bond. 398 However, although the court held that the taxpayers
could recover under the bonds for their attorney's fees in the underlying
declaratory judgment suit, the bonds imposed no obligation on the bond is-
suer because the taxpayer's group was neither a donee nor a creditor third-
party beneficiary of the bond contract between the officials and the bond
issuer. 399
Geters v. Eagle Insurance Company4° involved a motor vehicle dealer's
bond. The claimant purchased an automobile from a dealer who failed to
transfer title. After the claimant was arrested on suspicion of driving a sto-
len vehicle because of the dealer's failure to transfer title, the claimant ob-
tained a default judgment in excess of $150,000 against the dealer for DTPA
violations. The claimant then sought to recover $25,000 of this judgment
under the $25,000 motor vehicle dealer's bond required by statute.4° 1 The
court held, however, that the language of the bond and the legislative history
of the statutory requirement indicated that coverage under the bond was
limited for each claimant for the amount of "contractual recessionary dam-
ages" rather than tort or other extracontractual damages.4° 2 The court's
express rationale for this interpretation was to limit each claimant's potential
recovery so as to maximize the number of claimants protected under the
dealer's bond.4' 3
The Texas Supreme Court granted Geters' petition for writ of error and
reversed this decision in a unanimous per curiam opinion.'4" The Supreme
Court rejected the limited interpretation of damages relied upon by the court
of appeals and held instead that the unqualified use of the word "damages"
in the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Bond Statute4' 5 manifested an intent that the
bond be available to compensate all damage awards and not merely "reces-
395. 829 S.W.2d at 926; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1987).
396. Id. (citing Great American Ins. Co. v. Langdeau, 739 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1964);
Brown v. Sneed, 77 Tex. 471, 14 S.W. 248, 252 (1890)).
397. Id. at 927.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 928.
400. 824 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd per curiam, 834 S.W.2d 49
(Tex. 1992).
401. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6686(a)(1-A)(vii) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
402. 824 S.W.2d at 666.
403. Id.
404. Geters v. Eagle Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
405. See supra note 41.
19931 1587
SMU LAW REVIEW
sionary" damages. 4° 6
In First Texas Savings Association v. Reliance Insurance Co. ,47 the issue
was whether the loan exclusion clause under a savings and loan blanket bond
precluded recovery by the institution for losses sustained as the result of a
customer's check kiting scheme. The bond at issue specifically excluded any
"loss resulting directly or indirectly from the... non-payment of, or default
upon any loan . . . whether . . . procured in good faith or through trick,
artifice, fraud or false pretenses . . .,,48 Although the Fifth Circuit had
previously held that a check-kiting scheme was not a "loan" for purposes of
this bond exclusion, 4 9 the court held this rule inapplicable because in the
instant case the institution did not rely on previously deposited checks, but
rather the customer's express promise to immediately pay overdrafts. 410 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the loss caused by the customer's prearranged
overdraft authority constituted a "loan" for which the bond provided no
coverage.41'
C. STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
In Durish v. Texas State Board of Insurance,41 2 the court held unconstitu-
tional article 21.79D of the Texas Insurance Code413 on the ground that the
statute violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The stricken stat-
ute was enacted in 1989 and permitted an insurer to bring suit to prevent or
redress another's fraudulent insurance practice.414 The costs and attorney's
fees incurred in such an action could be used by the insurer to offset amounts
that the insurer owed the state.41 5 Moreover, this act related back to suits
commenced after 1986 so long as no final judgment had been rendered in
that action. 416 Concluding that the State Board of Insurance had standing
to assert the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws, the court
held that the statute impermissibly impaired the state's vested right to
payment.41 7
In MDPhysicians & Associates Inc. v. State Board of Insurance,41 8 the issue
was whether a self-funded multiple employer welfare arrangement was a
qualified ERISA benefit plan exempted by federal statute from state regula-
tion.419 The plan at issue offered medical and health benefits to the subscrib-
ing employers' employees, but was neither created nor administered on a
406. 834 S.W.2d at 50.
407. 950 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1992).
408. Id. at 1175.
409. Calcasieu-Marine Nat'l Bank v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 290, 294 n.4
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
410. 950 F.2d at 1177.
411. Id. at 1178.
412. 817 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
413. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 27.79D (Vernon Supp. 1991).
414. 817 S.W.2d at 766.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 766-67.
418. 957 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992).
419. Id. at 181.
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daily basis by the subscribing employers. Instead, the plan was created by
the administrator who profited from its operation. Further, there was no
other connection between the participating employers other than their par-
ticipation in the plan. Because the administrator was deemed to be acting on
its own behalf, rather than directly as an employer or indirectly on behalf of
the employers, 420 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the administrator failed to
qualify as an employer welfare benefit plan exempt from state insurance reg-
ulations under ERISA.421
D. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY - PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
An issue with great currency under a wide variety of policies was ad-
dressed in the context of a medical malpractice insurance policy in Cluett v.
Medical Protective Co. 422 In that case, an insurer brought a declaratory
judgment action to determine whether allegations that a physician alienated
the affection of, and became sexually involved with, the plaintiff's spouse
were based on the physician's rendition of a professional service.4 23 It was
undisputed that the physician and spouse first became acquainted with each
other because the physician served as pediatrician to the spouse's children.
The court canvassed the authorities from other jurisdictions and concluded
that sexual relations between a physician and a patient or a patient's parent
do not, as a matter of law, arise from the rendition of professional services
except when such conduct results from the displacement of the patient's feel-
ings toward another onto the health care provider during psychotherapeutic
treatment.
424
420. Id. at 186.
421. 957 F.2d at 186.
422. 829 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
423. Id. at 829.
424. Id. at 828-30.
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